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Abstract:	  We	   study	  whether	   leaders	   influence	   the	   unethical	   conduct	   of	   followers.	   To	  avoid	  selection	  issues	  present	  in	  natural	  environments,	  we	  use	  a	  laboratory	  experiment	  in	   which	   we	   form	   groups	   and	   assign	   leadership	   roles	   at	   random.	   We	   study	   an	  environment	   in	   which	   groups	   compete,	   with	   dishonest	   behavior	   enhancing	   group	  earnings	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   social	   welfare.	  We	   vary,	   by	   treatment,	   two	   instruments	  through	  which	   leaders	   can	   influence	   follower	   conduct—prominent	   statements	   to	   the	  group	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  monetary	  incentives.	  In	  general,	  the	  presence	  of	  active	  group	  leaders	   gives	   rise	   to	   significantly	   more	   dishonest	   behavior.	   Moreover,	   appointing	  leaders	   who	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   acted	   dishonestly	   in	   a	   preliminary	   stage	   of	   the	  experiment	   yields	   groups	   with	   significantly	   more	   unethical	   conduct.	   The	   analysis	   of	  leaders’	   strategies	   reveals	   that	   leaders’	   statements	   have	   a	   stronger	   effect	   on	   follower	  behavior	  than	  the	  ability	  to	  distribute	  financial	  rewards,	  and	  that	  leaders’	  propensity	  to	  act	   dishonestly	   correlates	   with	   their	   use	   of	   statements	   or	   incentives	   as	   a	   means	   for	  encouraging	  dishonest	  follower	  conduct.	  	  	  Keywords:	  leadership,	  ethics,	  dishonesty,	  experiment	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1. Introduction	   	  Responses	  to	  unethical	  conduct	  in	  organizational,	  political	  or	  social	  settings	  often	  turn	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  leaders	  in	  facilitating	  or	  encouraging	  such	  behavior.	  For	  example,	  accounts	   of	   corporate	   fraud	   often	   emphasize	   the	   influence	   of	   CEOs	   and	   other	   senior	  executives.	  Analysis	  of	   the	  well-­‐known	  case	  of	  WorldCom’s	  dramatic	   collapse	   in	  2002	  often	   focuses	   on	   the	   role	   played	   by	   its	   founder,	   chairman	   and	   CEO,	   Bernard	   Ebbers.	  Indeed,	   the	  Special	   Investigative	  Committee	  examining	  WorldCom’s	  collapse	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	   SEC	   prominently	   noted	   that	   Ebbers	   “was	   the	   source	   of	   the	   culture,	   as	   well	   as	  much	  of	  the	  pressure,	  that	  gave	  birth	  to	  this	  fraud”	  (Beresford,	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  1).	  	  	   However,	   despite	   the	   widespread	   belief	   that	   leaders	   play	   a	   critical	   role	   in	  producing	   unethical	   conduct	   in	   groups	   or	   firms	   that	   they	   lead,	   there	   is	   little	   direct	  evidence	  of	  such	  a	  relationship.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  since	  important	  challenges	  make	  it	  hard	   to	  cleanly	   identify	   the	   influence	  of	   leaders	   in	   fomenting	  unethical	  conduct.	  For	  starters,	   unethical	   conduct	   in	   the	   field,	   by	   its	   nature,	   is	   often	   hidden	   from	   view.	  We	  typically	  fail	  to	  observe	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  unethical	  conduct,	  either	  by	  leaders	  or	  by	  those	  who	  follow	  them,	  which	  makes	  the	  study	  of	  this	  relationship	  difficult.	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  actions	  of	  leaders	  and	  the	  unethical	  conduct	  of	   followers,	   causality	   is	  often	   impossible	   to	  establish	  due	   to	  non-­‐random	  selection	  of	  leaders	  in	  the	  field:	  when	  a	  corrupt	  firm	  has	  an	  unethical	  CEO,	  is	  the	  leader	  the	  source	  of	  the	  culture,	  or	  is	  it	  the	  culture	  that	  led	  to	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  unethical	  leader?	  	   Recognizing	   these	   identification	   problems,	   in	   this	   paper	   we	   employ	   a	   novel	  approach	   to	   study	   the	   relationship	   between	   leadership	   and	   unethical	   conduct.	   In	  particular,	   we	   conduct	   a	   laboratory	   experiment,	   which	   allows	   us	   to	   exploit	   the	   high	  degree	   of	   control	   afforded	   by	   the	   laboratory	   environment	   to	   avoid	   many	   of	   the	  problems	  present	   in	  more	  natural	  settings.	   In	  our	  experiment,	  we	  study	  the	   impact	  of	  leadership	  by	  exogenously	  varying	  who	  becomes	  a	  leader	  and	  which	  abilities	  the	  leader	  has	   to	   influence	   the	   behavior	   of	   members	   of	   each	   laboratory	   firm.	   We	   therefore	  compare	  firms	  with	  “leaders,”	  endowed	  with	  some	  of	  the	   influence	  channels	  typical	  of	  organizational	   leaders,	   such	  as	   the	  ability	   to	  make	  public	  statements	  and	  control	  over	  financial	   incentives,	  with	   “control”	   firms	   that	   hold	   everything	   constant	   except	   for	   the	  presence	  of	  such	  channels.	  Our	   results	   show	   that	   leaders	   who	   are,	   themselves,	   more	   dishonest	   in	   a	   first	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  yield	  groups	  that	  act	  more	  dishonestly.	  Thus,	  we	  provide	  clean	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evidence	  of	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  unethical	  leaders	  on	  the	  unethical	  conduct	  of	  followers.	  In	   particular,	   the	   ability	   of	   leaders	   to	   communicate	   to	   followers	   appears	   to	   be	  responsible	   for	   the	   largest	   increase	   in	   cheating—firms	   in	   environments	   with	   leaders	  who	  can	  make	  statements	  tend	  to	   increase	  dishonest	  behavior	  significantly	  more	  over	  time	  than	  firms	  where	  leaders	  have	  no	  such	  ability.	  Our	  study	  represents	  a	  novel	  contribution	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  leadership	  and	  the	  ethical	   conduct	   of	   groups.	   The	   argument	   that	   leaders	   shape	   the	   ethical	   conduct	   of	  followers	   is	   often	   supported	   in	   the	   existing	   literature	  by	   evidence	   that	   is	   not	   entirely	  compelling,	  due	  to	  the	  identification	  problems	  outlined	  above.	  For	  example,	  some	  of	  the	  strongest	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   such	   a	   relationship	   comes	   from	   studies	   that	   use	  survey-­‐based	   instruments	   to	  measure	   followers’	  perceptions	  of	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  a	  leader	  possesses	  “ethical”	  characteristics	  (e.g.,	  the	  “Ethical	  Leadership”	  scale	  developed	  by	  Brown,	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  and	  then	  correlate	  this	  measure	  with	  other	  subjective	  measures	  of	  whether	  individuals	  within	  an	  organization	  act	  ethically	  (Mayer,	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  While	  such	   studies	   often	   find	   positive	   correlations	   between	   perceptions	   of	   leaders’	   honesty	  and	  perceptions	  of	  ethical	  conduct	  in	  a	  firm,	  the	  results	  must	  be	  interpreted	  cautiously	  due	  to	  many	  possible	  interpretations,	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  correlated	  bias	  across	  such	  subjective	  measures.	  	  Given	  the	  hidden	  nature	  of	  unethical	  conduct,	  other	  studies	  attempt	  to	  identify	  a	  relationship	  with	  leadership	  by	  using	  objective	  measures	  of	  observable	  behaviors	  that	  are	   potentially	   correlated	   with	   unethical	   follower	   conduct,	   such	   as	   employee	   exit	   or	  excess	  costs	  (Detert,	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Burks	  &	  Krupka,	  2012).1	  A	  recent	  paper	  by	  Beekman,	  et	  al.	   (2013)	  similarly	  uses	  a	  proxy	   for	  corrupt	   leader	  behavior—the	  misplacement	  of	  community	   resources	   under	   the	   leader’s	   control—and	   shows	   that	   this	   leads	   to	   lower	  cooperation	   among	   community	   members,	   though	   not	   necessarily	   to	   more	   unethical	  conduct.	   As	  with	   the	   studies	   discussed	   above,	   these	   results	   are	  more	   suggestive	   of	   a	  relationship,	  since	  they	  ultimately	  only	  observe	  behavior	  that	  is	  imperfectly	  correlated	  with	  unethical	  conduct.2	  	  	   We	  follow	  other	  research	  that	  relies	  on	  laboratory	  experiments	  to	  identify	  causal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Pierce	  and	  Snyder	  (2008)	  similarly	  use	  observable	  measures	  of	  employee	  behavior	  to	  identify	  whether	  firms’	  ethical	  cultures	  influence	  the	  behavior	  of	  workers	  changing	  jobs.	  2	  Other	   studies,	  not	  directly	   related	   to	  ethical	   conduct,	   show	  a	   relationship	  between	   leaders’	  behaviors	  and	  the	  prevalence	  of	  cooperative	  behavior	  within	  a	  group	  (Kosfeld	  and	  Rustagi,	  2012;	  Jack	  and	  Recalde,	  2013).	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effects	   of	   leadership	   on	   follower	   behavior.3	   For	   instance,	   Potters,	   et	   al.	   (2007)	  experimentally	   investigate	   leading-­‐by-­‐example	   in	   a	  public	   good	  environment	  and	   find	  that	  contributions	  increase	  when	  a	  leader	  has	  private	  information	  about	  the	  returns	  to	  contributing.	  Also	   in	  a	  public	  good	  game,	  Hamman,	  et	  al.,	   (2011)	  show	  that	  delegating	  contribution	   decisions	   to	   a	   pro-­‐social	   leader	   allows	   groups	   to	   obtain	   full	   efficiency.	  Brandts	  and	  Cooper	  (2007)	  and	  Brandts,	  et	  al.	  (forthcoming)	  study	  the	  effect	  of	  leaders	  on	  effort	  provision	   in	  weak-­‐link	  coordination	  games,	   finding	   that	   leaders	  can	   increase	  minimum	   effort	   by	   means	   of	   communication,	   and	   that	   this	   may	   be	   a	   more	   effective	  strategy	  for	  inducing	  behavioral	  change	  than	  financial	  incentives.	  	  Our	   work	   also	   contributes	   to	   the	   growing	   experimental	   literature	   on	   the	  determinants	   of	   dishonest	   and	   unethical	   conduct	   (Gneezy,	   2005;	   Mazar,	   et	   al.,	   2008;	  Gino,	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Fischbacher	  and	  Föllmi-­‐Heusi,	  2013;	  Gibson,	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Conrads	  et	  al.,	   2013,	   2014).	   In	   line	   with	   these	   studies,	   we	   address	   the	   concern	   that	   unethical	  conduct	  is	  hard	  to	  observe	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  behavioral	  task	  in	  which	  subjects	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  act	  unethically—i.e.,	  to	  tell	  a	  lie	  for	  profit	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  will	  never	  be	   detected—but	   where	   our	   ability	   to	   create	   numerous	   identical	   replications	   of	   the	  same	  situation	  makes	   inference	   regarding	   the	  presence	  of	  unethical	   conduct	  possible.	  Specifically,	   we	   ask	   subjects	   to	   privately	   roll	   a	   die,	   but	   give	   them	   the	   opportunity	   to	  misreport	   the	   actual	   outcome,	   with	   no	   possibility	   that	   lies	   will	   be	   discovered	   (cf.	  Fischbacher	  and	  Föllmi-­‐Heusi,	  2013).	  Reporting	  a	  higher	  number	  earns	  more	  money	  for	  a	  subject	  and	  for	  others	  in	  the	  subject’s	  firm,	  but	  it	  also	  imposes	  an	  inefficient	  negative	  externality	  on	  everyone	  else	  in	  an	  experimental	  session—mimicking	  the	  property	  that	  widespread	  unethical	  conduct	  can	  be	  harmful	  to	  an	  industry.	  	  Thus,	   our	   experimental	   environment	   incorporates	   key	   features	   of	   real-­‐world	  situations	   involving	  a	   tension	  between	  acting	  ethically	  or	  unethically.	  Misrepresenting	  the	   die	   roll	   in	   our	   experiment,	   while	   personally	   beneficial	   and	   benefitting	   others	   in	  one’s	  firm,	  is	  wrong	  according	  to	  most	  normative	  moral	  principles	  (e.g.,	  Kant,	  1785;	  Mill,	  1863).	  Moreover,	  unethical	  conduct,	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  is	  entirely	  hidden	  from	  view,	  meaning	   there	   is	   zero	   probability	   of	   sanctioning	   or	   detection	   of	   individual	   unethical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   There	   are	   rare	   cases	   in	   which	   random	   variation	   exists	   in	   the	   field.	   These	   studies	   provide	   valuable	  insights	   into	   the	   influence	   and	   importance	   of	   leaders,	   e.g.,	   leaders’	   gender	   and	   public	   good	   provision	  (Chattopadhyay	  and	  Duflo,	  2004);	  national	  leaders	  and	  economic	  growth	  (Jones	  and	  Olken,	  2005);	  CEOs	  and	  firm	  performance	  (Malmendier	  and	  Tate,	  2009).	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conduct.	  Hence,	  “good”	  behavior	  is	  likely	  the	  result	  of	  ethical	  considerations,	  rather	  than	  fear	   of	   detection	   or	   punishment	   (Nagin,	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   can	  observe	   the	   aggregate	   results	   of	   many	   such	   individual	   decisions	   in	   our	   laboratory	  setting	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  statistical	  inference	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  unethical	  conduct,	  and	  how	  this	  varies	  with	  features	  of	  the	  environment.	  The	   main	   part	   of	   our	   experiment	   consists	   of	   two	   stages.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   is	  intended	  to	  obtain	  baseline	  measures	  of	  individuals’	  tendency	  to	  act	  unethically,	  while	  the	  second	  constitutes	  the	  interaction	  between	  leaders	  and	  workers.	  More	  precisely,	  in	  the	   first	   stage,	   participants	   perform	   the	   die-­‐roll	   task	   once	   individually,	   with	   the	  possibility	   to	   benefit	   personally	   from	  misreporting,	   which	   also	   harms	   all	   others	   in	   a	  subjects’	  experimental	  session.	  Thus,	  we	  obtain	  a	  (noisy)	  measure	  of	  each	   individual’s	  tendency	  to	  misreport,	  which	  we	  show	  correlates	  with	  other	  individual	  characteristics.	  	  In	   the	   second	   stage,	   which	   is	   our	   primary	   focus,	   participants	   are	   randomly	  matched	  into	  four-­‐person	  firms,	  and	  one	  person	  within	  each	  firm	  is	  randomly	  selected	  to	   be	   the	   leader,	   while	   the	   remaining	   three	   subjects	   are	   workers.	   In	   this	   stage,	   each	  firm’s	   payoff	   depends	   on	   the	   firm’s	   average	   reported	   performance,	   relative	   to	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  of	  other	  firms.	  Subjects	  repeat	  the	  die-­‐roll	  task	  10	  times	  in	  fixed	  groups.	  Experimental	  conditions	  vary	  whether	  leaders	  can	  make	  statements	  to	  workers,	   allocate	   financial	   rewards	   to	   them,	   or	   do	   both.	   In	   a	   control	   condition,	   with	  inactive	   leaders,	   they	  have	  no	  power	   at	   all	   and	   instead	   simply	  observe	  outcomes.	  We	  observe	   how	   reported	   performance	   varies	   over	   time	   depending	   on	   the	   experimental	  treatment,	   on	   specific	   strategies	   employed	   by	   the	   leaders,	   and	   on	   leader’s	  characteristics.	  The	   key	   variation	   that	   we	   introduce	   in	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   the	   experimental	  environment	  concerns	  the	  tools	  available	  to	  leaders	  to	  influence	  workers’	  reported	  die-­‐roll	  outcome.	  The	  first	  influence	  channel	  with	  which	  we	  provide	  leaders	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  public	  statements	  to	  the	  workers	  in	  their	  firm.	  Organizational	  leadership	  is	  often	  associated	  with	   someone	  who,	   from	   a	   position	   of	   prominence,	   can	   articulate	   a	   broad	  direction	  for	  the	  firm	  and	  motivate	  employees	  in	  pursuit	  of	  that	  end	  (Kotter,	  1990).	  In	  his	   seminal	   book	   on	   corporate	   executives,	   Barnard	   (1938)	   notes	   that	   one	   of	   their	  fundamental	  functions	  “is	  to	  formulate	  and	  define	  the	  purposes,	  objectives,	  ends,	  of	  the	  organization”	  (p.	  231).	  Modern	  studies	  of	  and	  training	  in	  corporate	  leadership	  similarly	  note	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  leader’s	  ability	  to	  motivate	  and	  convince	  followers	  to	  pursue	  a	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particular	   direction,	   often	   through	   prominent	   and	   visible	   speeches	   (Antonakis,	   et	   al.,	  2012).	   As	   noted	   by	   Lazear	   (2012),	   leaders	   “choose	   the	   right	   direction	   for	   an	  organization.	   Leaders	   communicate	   to	   their	   subordinates	   and	  motivate	   them	   to	   take	  productive	  actions”	  (p.	  92).	  We	  implement	  a	  simple	  form	  of	  this	  leadership	  function	  in	  our	  experiment,	  by	  providing	   leaders	  with	  a	  platform	  to	  send	  messages	   to	  workers	   in	  their	  firm	  between	  periods	  of	  the	  task.	  Second,	   corporate	   leaders	   often	   possess	   discretion	   over	   financial	   incentives.	   A	  central	  theme	  in	  organizational	  economics	  is	  the	  use	  of	  monetary	  incentives	  as	  a	  means	  for	  motivating	  employees	  to	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  desired	  by	  their	  employers	  or	  supervisors.	  Such	   incentives	   take	   many	   forms,	   from	   fixed	   wages,	   to	   precisely	   defined	   explicit	  performance	   contracts,	   to	   subjectively	   determined	   performance	   bonuses	   at	   the	  discretion	  of	  supervisors	  (Baker,	  et	  al.,	  1994;	  Prendergast,	  1999).	  In	  principle,	  a	  leader	  could	  use	  any	   form	  of	  variable	  pay	   to	   incentivize	  ethical	  or	  unethical	  behavior.	   In	  our	  experiment,	   we	   provide	   leaders	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   distribute	   part	   of	   employees’	  compensation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  discretionary	  bonus.	  	  Note	   that	   these	   two	   instruments	   available	   to	   leaders	   in	   our	   experiment	  correspond	   to	   important	   influence	   channels	   ascribed	   to	   leaders	   in	   the	   leadership	  literature.	   For	   example,	   central	   to	   the	   study	   of	   leadership	   in	   the	   organizational	  literature	   is	   a	   distinction	   between	   “transactional”	   and	   “transformational”	   leaders	  (Burns,	  1978),	  with	  the	  former	  inducing	  change	  among	  followers	  through	  sanctions	  and	  rewards	   and	   the	   latter	   doing	   so	   through	   persuasion	   and	   by	   influencing	   follower	  preferences	  (Bass,	  1990).	  Thus,	  our	  design	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  simple	  way	  of	  providing	  leaders	  with	  simple	  versions	  of	  these	  two	  potential	  influence	  channels.4	  We	   classify	   leaders	   as	   likely	   honest	   or	   dishonest,	   based	   on	   their	   reported	  performance	   in	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   experiment.	  We	   find	   that	   dishonest	   leaders	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   encourage	   dishonesty,	   particularly	   through	   their	   use	   of	   statements.	  Moreover,	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  leaders’	  rewarding	  and	  communication	  strategies,	  we	  find	  that	  leaders	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  followers	  both	  through	  the	  statements	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Of	   course,	   leaders	   also	   do	  many	   other	   things	   than	  what	  we	   allow	   them	   to	   do	   in	   our	   experiment.	   For	  example,	  they	  often	  set	  examples	  for	  followers	  through	  their	  actions	  (Hermalin,	  1998;	  Levati,	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  and	  select	  or	  exclude	  organizational	  members	  (Güth,	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  For	  simplicity	  and	  control,	  we	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  two	  specific	   leadership	  functions	  in	  the	  current	  experiment.	  The	  omission	  of	  other	  channels	  of	  leader	   influence	   likely	  underestimates	   the	  degree	   to	  which	   leaders	   influence	   followers	   in	  more	  natural	  settings.	  Our	  experimental	  design	  can	  be	  naturally	  extended	  to	  include	  other	  such	  possible	  channels.	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they	  make	  and	  through	  the	  use	  of	  bonuses.	  Statements	  from	  leaders	  requesting	  honest	  reporting	   are	   effective	   in	   yielding	   firms	   that	   (statistically)	   report	   more	   honestly.	  However,	   leaders’	  statements	  tend,	  over	  time,	   toward	  requests	   for	  greater	  dishonesty,	  thus	  producing	  a	  strong	  tendency	  toward	  misreporting	   in	  conditions	   in	  which	   leaders	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  with	  workers.	  	  Our	   results	   have	   potentially	   important	   policy	   implications	   for	   the	   design	   of	  organizations	   and	   the	   definition	   of	   leaders’	   responsibilities.	   Most	   importantly,	   we	  document	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  unethical	  leaders	  and	  the	  unethical	  behavior	  of	  those	  they	  lead—unethical	  leaders	  tend	  to	  produce	  more	  unethical	  conduct.	  Moreover,	  we	  show	  that	  leaders’	  statements	  to	  those	  they	  lead	  are	  a	  central	  channel	  through	  which	  such	   influence	   occurs	   and	   that	   such	   influence	   can	   be	   stronger	   than	   that	   of	   financial	  rewards.	  We	   also	   show	  a	   direct	   link	   between	   leaders’	   ethical	   conduct,	   their	   choice	   of	  leadership	  strategies	  and	  group	  members’	  honesty.	  Such	  leadership	  effects	  underscore	  the	   importance	   of	   establishing	   institutional	   checks	   on	   leaders’	   ethical	   behavior,	   since	  leaders	  can	  spread	  unethical	  behavior	  within	  an	  organization	  at	  very	  little	  cost,	   if	  they	  wish.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  our	  study	  also	  indicates	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  ethical	  leaders	  and	  their	  use	  of	  strategies,	  including	  public	  statements,	  that	  encourage	  ethical	  conduct	  may	  have	  strongly	  positive	  effects	  on	  followers’	  ethical	  behavior.	  The	   rest	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   In	   section	   2,	   we	   describe	   the	  experimental	  design.	  In	  section	  3,	  we	  present	  our	  results.	  Section	  4	  concludes.	  	  
2. Experimental	  design	  	   Each	   experimental	   session	   consists	   of	   20	   participants	   interacting	   through	  computers.	   The	   experiment	   comprises	   three	   stages,	   with	   the	   first	   two	   stages	  constituting	   the	   main	   part	   (see	   Figure	   A.1	   in	   the	   Appendix	   for	   an	   overview	   of	   the	  experiment).	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  subjects	  engage	  in	  an	  individual	  reporting	  task,	  in	  which	  they	   can	   act	   unethically	   by	   inflating	   their	   performance	   and	   thereby	   obtain	   higher	  individual	  earnings	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  social	  welfare.	  The	  second	  stage	  modifies	  the	  task	  into	   one	   in	   which	   subjects	   repeatedly	   compete	   in	   “firms,”	   with	   varying	   degrees	   and	  forms	  of	  leadership,	  for	  10	  periods.	  Our	  primary	  focus	  is	  on	  how	  leadership	  influences	  misreporting	   in	   the	   second	   stage.	   In	   the	   third	   stage,	   we	   elicit	  measures	   of	   perceived	  social	   norms	   of	   conduct,	   using	   a	   procedure	   developed	   by	   Krupka	   and	  Weber	   (2013),	  and	   also	   several	   individual-­‐level	   characteristics	   through	   a	   questionnaire.	   Subjects	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receive	  the	  instructions	  for	  each	  stage	  separately	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  stage,	  but	  are	  informed	  about	  the	  overall	  structure	  of	  the	  experiment	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  	  
2.1 First	  stage	  	   In	  the	  first	  stage,	  all	  20	  participants,	  𝑖 ∈ 1, . . . , 20 ,	  compete	  for	  a	  prize	  of	  varying	  size,	   𝑉.	   We	   introduce	   the	   possibility	   of	   cheating	   in	   the	   competition—which	   is	  undetectable	   and	   profitable	   for	   an	   individual,	   but	   socially	   inefficient—as	   a	   way	   of	  studying	  unethical	  behavior.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  stage,	  each	  subject	  privately	  rolls	  a	  fair	  six-­‐sided	  die,	  the	  outcome	   of	   which,	   𝑝! ,	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   subject’s	   actual	   realized	   type	   or	  performance	   in	   that	   period.	   Thus,	   actual	   “performance”	   is	   uniformly	   distributed	   over	  the	  outcomes,	  𝑝! ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 6 .	  Subjects	  are	  instructed	  that	  it	  is	  this	  value,	  pi,	  which	  they	  are	   supposed	   to	   report	   as	   their	   performance	   in	   the	   period	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	  competition.	   However,	   since	   only	   a	   subject	   observes	   his	   or	   her	   own	   die	   roll,	   the	  performance	  reported	  by	  any	  subject,	  𝑝! ,	  can	  be	  any	  integer	  from	  1	  to	  6	  that	  the	  subject	  chooses	  to	  report.	  Each	  subject	  receives	  a	  share	  of	  the	  prize,	  𝑠! ,	  which	  increases	  in	  that	  subject’s	  own	  reported	  performance,	  𝑝! ,	  relative	  to	  the	  performance	  reported	  by	  other	  subjects,  𝑝!! .	  Below,	  we	  provide	  the	  precise	  formula	  for	  determining	  𝑠! .	  The	   size	   of	   the	   total	   prize	   available	   is	   a	   function	   of	   the	   average	   performance	  reported	  by	  all	  subjects.	  Specifically,	  the	  total	  prize	  obtains	  its	  maximum	  possible	  value	  as	  long	  as	  the	  average	  of	  all	  the	  𝑝! 	  is	  equal	  to	  or	  below	  the	  expected	  mean	  of	  20	  fair	  die	  rolls,	  or	  3.5.	  However,	  if	  the	  mean	  reported	  performance	  exceeds	  3.5	  then	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	   decreases	   linearly	   with	   the	   average	   reported	   performance.	   Thus,	   misreporting	  negatively	  impacts	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize,	  and	  the	  prize	  is	  lowest	  when	  all	  subjects	  report	  the	  maximum	  possible	  performance	  of	  6.	  Our	  design,	   therefore,	  captures	   the	  property	  that	  widespread	  unethical	  conduct	  can	  harm	  a	  society	  or	  industry.	  Hence,	  misreporting	  in	   our	   experiment	   is	   “wrong”	   both	   because	   it	   involves	   telling	   a	   lie	   (i.e.,	   violating	  deontological	   ethical	   principles)	   and	   because	   it	   harms	   social	   welfare	   (violating	  consequentialist	  moral	  principles,	  such	  as	  utilitarianism).	  More	   precisely,	   a	   subject’s	   profit,	   𝜋! ,	   is	   the	   subject’s	   share	   of	   the	   prize,	  determined	   by	   the	   ratio	   of	   own	   performance	   to	   total	   performance,	  multiplied	   by	   the	  total	  size	  of	  the	  available	  prize:	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𝜋! = 𝑠! 𝑝! ,𝑝!!   𝑉 𝑝! ,𝑝!! = !!!!! !!!"!!!,!!!   𝑉 𝑝! ,𝑝!! 	  	  
with	  𝑉 𝑝! ,𝑝!! = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏   !!! !!!"!!!,!!!!" − 𝜇 𝑖𝑓   !!
!"!!!!" ≤ 𝜇𝑖𝑓   !!!"!!!!" > 𝜇	  ,	  where  𝜇 = 3.5,	  𝑎 = 1250	  and	  𝑏 = 300.	  Subjects’	  payoffs	  are	  measured	  in	  Experimental	  Currency	  Units	  (ECUs),	  which	  are	  converted	  into	  money	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  The	  parameters	  are	  chosen	  such	  that,	  under	  the	  assumption	  of	  self-­‐interest	  and	  no	  psychological	  cost	   to	   lying,	   the	  unique	  Nash	  equilibrium	  is	   for	  all	  players	   to	  report	  the	  highest	  possible	  outcome	  of	  the	  die	  roll,	  𝑝! = 6	  (see	  Appendix	  C).	  This	  yields	  a	  total	  prize	  of	  𝑉 = 500,	  which	  is	  considerably	  lower	  than	  the	  maximal	  possible	  total	  prize	  of	  𝑉 = 1250.	  After	   rolling	   the	   die	   privately,	   each	   subject	   enters	   his	   or	   her	   reported	  performance	  on	  the	  computer.	  While	  we	  cannot	  detect	  lying	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  the	  aggregate	  distribution	  of	  reported	  performance	  values	  allows	  us	  to	  detect,	  statistically,	  the	  degree	  of	  misreporting	  (cf.	  Houser,	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Fischbacher	  and	  Föllmi-­‐Heusi,	  2013;	  Gino,	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  task	  is	  performed	  only	  once	  in	  Stage	  1	  and	  afterwards	  all	  subjects	  are	  informed	  about	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  across	  all	  subjects,	  the	  total	  size	  of	  the	  prize,	  and	  their	  own	  payoff	  for	  Stage	  1.	  	  
2.2 Second	  stage	  In	   the	   second	   stage	   we	   use	   the	   same	   task,	   but	   this	   time	   in	   the	   context	   of	  competing	   “firms,”	  where	   inflation	   of	   performance	   by	   a	  worker	   benefits	   the	  worker’s	  firm,	  but	  imposes	  a	  negative	  externality	  on	  all	  other	  firms.	  	  In	   Stage	   2,	   the	   20	   subjects	   in	   a	   session	   are	   randomly	  matched	   into	   five	   four-­‐person	   firms—consisting	   each	   of	   three	   workers	   and	   one	   leader	   (referred	   to	   as	   the	  “supervisor”).	   Workers	   individually	   and	   privately	   each	   roll	   a	   die	   and	   report	  performance,	  as	  in	  Stage	  1.	  The	  function	  of	  the	  leaders	  varies	  by	  condition.	  	  Similarly	   to	   Stage	   1,	   firms	   compete	   for	   shares	   of	   the	   prize,	   𝑉.	   Each	   firm,	   𝑓 ∈1, 2,… , 5 ,	  obtains	  a	  share,	  𝑠! ,	  based	  on	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  by	  the	  three	  workers	   in	   that	   firm,	  𝑝! = 𝑝!,!!!!! 3,	   relative	   to	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  in	   other	   firms.	   As	   in	   Stage	   1,	   𝑉	   is	   highest	   when	   the	   average	   of	   all	   firms’	   reported	  performance	   levels	   is	   no	   greater	   than	   3.5,	   but	   decreases	   for	   higher	   average	   reported	  performance	  across	  the	  industry.	  	  The	  profit	  obtained	  by	  each	  firm	  is	  then:	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𝜋! = 𝑠! 𝑝! ,𝑝!!   𝑉 𝑝! ,𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!   𝑉 𝑝! ,𝑝!! 	  	  
with	  𝑉 𝑝! ,𝑝!! = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏   !!!!!!! − 𝜇 𝑖𝑓   !!
!!!!! ≤ 𝜇𝑖𝑓   !!!!!!! > 𝜇,	  where	  𝜇 = 3.5,	  𝑎 = 1250,	  and	  𝑏 = 300.	  Each	  subject	  in	  firm	  𝑓	  receives	  an	  individual	  share	  𝑥!,!	  of	  the	  firm’s	  profit	  𝜋! .	  The	  leader	   always	   receives	   a	   share	   of	   one-­‐fourth	   of	   the	   total	   firm	   profit,	  𝑥!,! = 0.25.	   The	  shares	   received	   by	  workers	   can	   vary	   across	   experimental	   conditions.	   In	   some	   of	   our	  conditions,	  each	  of	  the	  four	  firm	  members	  receives	  an	  equal	  share	  of	  the	  firm’s	  profits,	  e.g.,	   𝑥!,! = 0.25  with	   𝑖 ∈ 𝐿, 1, 2, 3 .	   If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   each	   individual	   worker	   benefits	  from	   reporting	   the	  highest	  possible	   performance	   level,	   or	  6,	   regardless	   of	  what	   other	  subjects	   report	   (see	   Appendix	   C).	   In	   other	   experimental	   conditions,	   described	   below,	  the	   firm	   supervisor	   can	   determine	   the	   share	   of	   the	   firm’s	   profits	   received	   by	   each	  worker.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   supervisor’s	   reward	   strategy	   can	   either	   strengthen	   or	  weaken	  the	  incentives	  to	  report	  performance	  of	  6.	  	  Roles	  of	  workers	  and	  supervisors	  are	  allocated	  randomly	  within	  each	  firm,	  and	  remain	   fixed	   during	   all	   10	   periods	   of	   Stage	   2.	   After	   each	   period,	   all	   subjects	   are	  informed	  about	  their	  own	  profit,	   their	   firm’s	  profit,	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  of	  each	  of	  the	  five	  firms,	  the	  overall	  average	  reported	  performance	  level,	  and	  the	  individual	  reported	  performance	  levels	  and	  profits	  of	  all	  members	  of	  their	  own	  firm.	  	  	  
2.3 Leader	  conditions	  We	   study	   four	   treatment	   conditions,	   in	   a	   2	   x	   2	   design	   (see	   Table	   1),	   which	   vary	   the	  instruments	  available	  to	  the	  leader	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment.	  In	  particular,	  we	  vary	  the	  ability	  of	  leaders	  to	  determine	  incentives,	  through	  performance	  bonuses,	  or	  to	  articulate	  a	  direction	  for	  the	  firm,	  through	  prominent	  statements	  to	  workers.	  	  	  
Table	  1:	  Overview	  of	  treatment	  conditions	  
Treatment	   No	  incentive	  power	   Incentive	  power	  
No	  public	  statements	   Inactive	  Leader	   Leader	  Incentives	  Only	  
Public	  statements	   Leader	  Statements	  Only	   Leader	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Note:	  For	  each	  condition,	  we	  conducted	  four	  sessions	  with	  20	  subjects	  each.	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Public	  statements	  vs.	  No	  public	  statements.	  In	  the	  two	  conditions	  with	  public	  statements,	  leaders	  send	  a	  message	  to	  the	  three	  workers	  in	  their	  firm	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	   each	   period,	   before	   workers	   roll	   their	   dice	   and	   report	   their	   performance	   level.	  Specifically,	   leaders	  have	  90	   seconds	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  period	   to	   send	  a	  written	  message	   to	   workers	   in	   their	   firms	   using	   the	   computer	   interface.5	   Leaders	   send	  statements	  to	  their	  workers,	  but	  workers	  cannot	  reply	  to	  the	  leader	  or	  send	  messages	  to	  one	   another.	   Conversely,	   in	   the	   two	   conditions	   without	   public	   statements,	   leaders	  cannot	  send	  messages	  to	  workers.	  
Incentive	   power	   vs.	   No	   incentive	   power.	   In	   the	   two	   conditions	   in	   which	  leaders	  have	  no	  incentive	  power,	  all	  four	  subjects	  in	  each	  firm	  receive	  the	  same	  share,	  25	   percent,	   of	   the	   group	   profit	   as	   payoff	   in	   a	   period.	   Thus,	   worker	   payoffs	   are	  independent	  of	  any	  actions	  of	  the	  leader.	  In	  the	  conditions	  with	  leader	  incentive	  power,	  leaders	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   distribute	   financial	   rewards	   among	   the	   workers.	   Leaders	  observe	  the	  reported	  performance	  level	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  workers	  in	  the	  firm,	  and	  the	  resulting	   firm	   profit,	   and	   must	   then	   decide	   how	   to	   allocate	   45%	   of	   the	   group	   profit	  among	  the	  three	  workers.6	  The	   leader	  has	  to	  allocate	  the	  entire	  45%	  among	  the	  three	  workers	   and	   cannot	   keep	   any	   part	   of	   it	   or	   hold	   money	   back.	   More	   precisely,	   of	   the	  profits	   received	   by	   the	   firm	   in	   a	   period,  𝜋! ,	   the	   leader	   receives	   a	   fixed	   share	   of	   one-­‐fourth,	  𝑥!,! = 0.25.	  The	  three	  workers	  each	  receive	  a	  guaranteed	  portion	  of	  the	  profits,	  10	  percent,	  plus	  a	  share	  of	  the	  remaining	  45	  percent	  of	  the	  firm	  profits	  allocated	  to	  that	  worker	  by	  the	  leader.	  That	  is,	  a	  worker’s	  share	  of	  the	  firm’s	  payoff	  is,	  𝑥!,! = 0.10+ 𝑦!,! ,	  where	  𝑦!,! ∈ 0, 0.45 	  is	  the	  share	  of	  the	  discretionary	  bonus	  allocated	  to	  that	  worker	  by	  the	  leader	  and	   𝑦!,!!!!! = 0.45.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period,	  workers	  are	  informed	  about	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Subjects	  are	  asked	  not	  to	  use	  offensive	  language,	  not	  to	  identify	  themselves,	  nor	  to	  try	  to	  identify	  others.	  6	   We	   choose	   this	   type	   of	   incentive	   for	   a	   few	   reasons.	   First,	   such	   subjective	   allocation	   of	   rewards	   is	  commonplace	  in	  many	  firms,	  e.g.,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  discretionary	  monetary	  bonuses	  or	  fixed	  pay	  increases	  in	  contexts	   ranging	   from	   financial	   firms	   to	   academic	   departments	   or	   in	   the	   allocation	   of	   non-­‐financial	  rewards	  such	  as	  desirable	  office	  space	  or	  professional	  perks.	  Second,	  since	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  unethical	  conduct,	  which	   is	  often	  unobservable	   and	  unenforceable	   in	  pay	   contracts,	   a	  discretionary	  bonus	   seems	  appropriate.	  Third,	  we	  wanted	  to	  provide	  leaders	  with	  considerable	  flexibility	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  allocate	  rewards;	  this	  is	  limited	  if	  we	  provide	  them	  with	  one	  specific	  kind	  of	  incentive	  contract	  (e.g.,	  a	  piece-­‐rate	  or	   target-­‐based	  scheme)	  and	  complicates	   the	  experiment	   if	  we	   introduce	   too	  many	  such	  schemes.	  Note	  also	   that,	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   make	   statements	   to	   employees,	   our	   firm	   leaders	   are,	   in	  principle,	  able	  to	  specify	  a	  large	  variety	  of	  ex	  ante	  performance	  contracts.	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reported	   performance,	   allocated	   rewards,	   and	   total	   earnings	   of	   all	   workers	   in	   their	  firm.7	  Thereby,	  they	  can	  infer	  which	  kind	  of	  reported	  performance	  the	  leader	  rewards.	  The	   Leader	   condition	   in	   our	   experiment	   provides	   leaders	   with	   both	   channels	  through	  which	  they	  can	  influence	  the	  conduct	  of	  firm	  workers,	   i.e.	  the	  leader	  can	  send	  statements	   before	   every	   period	   and	   allocate	   rewards	   at	   the	   end	   of	   each	   period.	   The	  
Inactive	  Leader	  condition	  serves	  as	  a	  suitable	  control—there	  is	  still	  a	  person	  in	  the	  role	  of	  “supervisor”	  and	  this	  person	  receives	  a	  25-­‐percent	  share	  of	  the	  firm’s	  profits.	  But,	  this	  person	  cannot	  do	  any	  of	  the	  things	  that	  leaders	  do.	  A	  comparison	  between	  the	  Inactive	  Leader	   and	   Leader	   conditions	   allows	   us	   to	   understand	   the	   causal	   effect	   of	   having	  someone	  with	  these	  leadership	  instruments	  on	  the	  ethical	  conduct	  of	  followers.	  The	   two	   other	   conditions,	   Leader	   Statements	   Only	   and	   Leader	   Incentives	   Only,	  vary	  only	   in	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  these	  two	  instruments	  available	  to	  the	   leader.	  By	   eliminating	   one	   instrument	   and	   keeping	   the	   other,	   we	   provide	   evidence	   on	   the	  relative	  importance	  of	  these	  distinct	  potential	  influence	  channels.	  Moreover,	  within	  each	  condition	  with	  an	  active	  leader	  (i.e.,	  excluding	  the	  Inactive	  Leader	  condition),	  we	  can	  test	  how	  different	  characteristics	  of	  and	  strategies	  employed	  by	  leaders	  affect	  the	  degree	  of	  misreporting	  in	  their	  firms.	  This	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  test	  our	  central	  motivating	  question—whether	  unethical	  leaders	  (identified	  statistically	  by	  their	  behavior	  in	  Stage	  1)	  yield	  more	  unethical	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  workers.	  	  
2.4 Third	  stage	  Following	  Stage	  2,	  we	  elicit	  subjects’	  perceptions	  of	  social	  norms	  regarding	  the	  appropriateness	   of	   inflating	   performance	   in	   the	   first	   and	   second	   stages	   of	   the	  experiment.	  We	  follow	  the	  method	  introduced	  by	  Krupka	  and	  Weber	  (2013),	   in	  which	  subjects	  are	  provided	  with	  a	  description	  of	  a	  possibly	  unethical	  act,	  and	   then	  rate	   the	  “social	   appropriateness”	   of	   this	   behavior,	   with	   an	   incentive	   to	   match	   the	   ratings	  provided	   by	   others.8	   We	   use	   these	   elicited	   social	   norms	   to	   explore	   whether	   leaders	  affect	  the	  social	  norms	  held	  by	  individuals	  in	  the	  firms	  that	  they	  lead.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  information	  available	  to	  all	  subjects	  is	  constant	  across	  experimental	  conditions	  (see	  section	  2.2).	  8	  For	  instance,	  we	  ask	  subjects	  to	  rate	  how	  socially	  appropriate	  it	  is	  for	  a	  subject	  who	  rolled	  a	  1	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  to	  report	  a	  higher	  number.	  We	  incentivize	  their	  answer	  by	  giving	  them	  an	  extra	  £	  0.5,	  if	  their	  answer	  matches	  the	  answer	  of	  a	  randomly	  chosen	  other	  subject	  in	  their	  session.	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Finally,	   we	   collect	   several	   psychological	   measures	   of	   personality	   traits	  (Protected	  Values	   toward	   acting	   dishonestly,	   following	  Gibson,	   et	   al.	   (2013);	   Big	   Five	  15-­‐item	  version;	  Machiavellianism	  MACH	  IV)	  as	  well	  as	  socio-­‐demographic	  measures.9	  	  	  
2.5 Procedural	  details	  In	   total	  320	  subjects	  participated	   in	   the	  experiment—80	  subjects	   (20	   firms)	   in	  each	  condition.	  Of	   the	   total	  participants,	  41%	  were	  students	  of	  economics,	   finance,	  or	  management	   and	   56%	   were	   male	   (see	   Table	   B.1	   in	   the	   Appendix	   for	   summary	  statistics).	   The	   experiment	  was	   computerized	   using	   the	   software	   z-­‐tree	   (Fischbacher,	  2007)	   and	   subjects	   were	   recruited	   using	   ORSEE	   (Greiner,	   2004).	   All	   sessions	   were	  conducted	   in	   January	  and	  February	  2013	  at	   the	  Birmingham	  Experimental	  Economics	  Laboratory	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Birmingham.	  Experimental	  Currency	  Units	  (ECUs)	  were	  converted	  into	  GBP	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  40	  ECUs	  =	  1	  GBP.	  Each	  session	  lasted	  approximately	  two	  hours,	  and	  subjects	  earned,	  on	  average,	  £	  19.94	  including	  a	  show-­‐up	  fee	  of	  £	  2.50.	  	  
3. Results	  In	   presenting	   our	   results,	   we	   first	   discuss	   subjects’	   behavior	   in	   Stage	   1,	   to	   get	   a	  sense	   of	   the	   prevalence	   of	   dishonesty	   in	   the	   population	   (cf.	   Fischbacher	   and	   Föllmi-­‐Heusi,	   2013).	   Then,	   we	   turn	   to	   our	   main	   research	   question—i.e.,	   whether	   leader	  characteristics	   influence	   workers’	   performance	   reports	   in	   Stage	   2.	   Afterward,	   we	  analyze	  through	  which	  channels	  leaders	  affect	  firm	  behavior.	  	  
3.1 Individual	  behavior	  in	  Stage	  1	  Table	  2	  shows	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  in	  Stage	  1,	  by	  condition.	  Recall,	  that	   Stage	   1	   is	   identical	   across	   all	   conditions;	   instructions	   for	   Stage	   2	   are	   only	  distributed	  after	  Stage	  1.	  In	  all	  conditions,	  we	  find	  evidence	  of	  misreporting.	  Overall,	  the	  mean	  reported	  score	  is	  approximately	  4.5,	  which	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  empirically	  expected	  mean	  score,	  of	  3.5.10	  Note,	  however,	  that	  these	  scores	  are	  still	  well	  below	  the	  individual	  payoff-­‐maximizing	  report	  of	  6.	  As	  expected,	   individual	  behavior	   in	   the	   first	  stage	  does	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Appendix	  D	  provides	  the	  complete	  instructions	  used	  in	  the	  experiment.	  10	   Recoding	   the	   observed	   die-­‐roll	   outcomes	   of	   the	   “externality	   treatment”	   in	   Fischbacher	   and	   Föllmi-­‐Heusi	  (2013)	   to	  correspond	  to	  our	  design	  yields	  a	  mean	  score	  of	  4.18,	  which	   is	  marginally	  significantly	  lower	  than	  our	  observed	  mean	  outcome	  (t-­‐test	  p=0.10).	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not	   differ	   significantly	   between	   the	   four	   conditions	   (two-­‐sided	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   test	  p=0.85).11	  	  	  
Table	  2:	  Average	  reported	  performance	  in	  Stage	  1	  
Inactive	  	  
Leader	  




Total	  4.48	   4.49	   4.59	   4.44	   4.50	  N=80	   N=80	   N=80	   N=80	   N=320	  	  	   The	   distribution	   of	   reported	   performance	   levels	   is	   also	   highly	   right-­‐skewed:	  26.25%	  of	  observations	  are	  3	  or	  lower,	  while	  73.75%	  are	  4	  and	  above.	  The	  median	  is	  5	  and	   the	   mode	   of	   the	   distribution	   is	   at	   6.	   Figure	   A.2	   in	   the	   Appendix	   shows	   the	  distributions	   of	   reported	   performance	   by	   condition	   and	   Table	   B.2	   in	   the	   Appendix	  shows	   that,	   in	   every	   condition,	   the	   frequency	   of	   scores	   of	   1	   (6)	   is	   significantly	   lower	  (higher)	  than	  the	  expected	  frequency	  of	  1/6.	  	  	   Finally,	  we	  consider	  whether	   individual	   characteristics,	  measured	  at	   the	  end	  of	  the	   experiment,	   predict	   Stage	   1	   responses.	   Regression	   analysis	   shows	   that	   reported	  performance	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  is	  significantly	  higher	   if	   the	  subject	   is	  male,	  younger,	  an	  economics	  student,	  or	  scores	  higher	  on	  the	  Big	  Five	  conscientiousness	  dimension	  (Table	  B.3	  in	  the	  Appendix).12 	  
3.2 Do	  unethical	  leaders	  produce	  unethical	  groups?	  We	   next	   consider	   behavior	   in	   Stage	   2,	   when	   subjects	   performed	   the	   task	  collectively	   in	   firms,	   sometimes	   with	   active	   leaders.	   To	   analyze	   whether	   unethical	  leaders	   influence	   the	   degree	   of	   misreporting	   among	   their	   workers,	   we	   first	   need	   to	  construct	   a	   measure	   of	   a	   leader’s	   propensity	   to	   act	   honestly.	   Specifically,	   we	   use	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Pair-­‐wise	  Mann-­‐Whitney	   tests	   reveal	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  any	   two	  conditions:	   Inactive	  Leader	  vs.	  Leader	  Statements	  Only	  (p=0.64),	  Inactive	  Leader	  vs.	  Leader	  Incentives	  Only	  (p=0.59),	  Inactive	  Leader	   vs.	   Leader	   (p=0.97),	   Leader	   Statements	   Only	   vs.	   Leader	   Incentives	   Only	   (p=0.34),	   Leader	  Statements	  Only	  vs.	  Leader	  (p=0.75),	  and	  Leader	  Incentives	  Only	  vs.	  Leader	  (p=0.66).	  Moreover,	  the	  mean	  reported	  performance	  of	  subjects	  subsequently	  assigned	  to	  be	  leaders	  (4.43)	  does	  not	  differ	  significantly	  from	  the	  mean	  reported	  performance	  by	  those	  who	  became	  workers	  (4.52;	  two-­‐sided	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  test	  p=0.44).	  12	  Conscientiousness	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  tendency	  to	  show	  self-­‐discipline	  and	  act	  dutifully.	  It	  is	  related	  to	  the	  way	   in	   which	   people	   control,	   regulate,	   and	   direct	   their	   impulses.	   High	   scores	   on	   conscientiousness	  indicate	  a	  preference	  for	  planned	  rather	  than	  spontaneous	  behavior	  (Costa	  and	  McCrae,	  1992).	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binary	  variable,	  dishonest	   leader,	  which	   indicates	  whether	   a	   leader’s	   reported	  Stage	  1	  performance	  equals	  6.	  Since	  the	  frequency	  of	  scores	  of	  6	  in	  Stage	  1,	  equal	  to	  37.53%,	  is	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  expected	  frequency	  of	  1/6	  (see	  Figure	  A.2	  in	  the	  Appendix),	  we	  expect	  this	  variable	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	  misreporting.	  Note	  that	  this	  proportion	  is	  more	  than	  twice	  as	  high	  as	   the	  expected	  frequency.	  Hence,	  conditional	  on	  observing	  a	  reported	   performance	   of	   6,	   it	   is	   more	   likely	   that	   an	   individual	   in	   our	   experiment	  misreported	  than	  otherwise.13	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Leaders’	  honesty	  and	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  over	  time	  
	  	  Figure	  1	   shows	   average	   reported	   group	  performance	  over	   time	   in	   the	   Inactive	  Leader	  condition	  and	   in	  all	  conditions	  with	  active	   leaders.	  We	  divide	  the	  observations	  from	   the	   active	   leader	   conditions,	   depending	   on	   whether	   the	   leader	   is	   classified	   as	  dishonest	   or	   not.	   The	   graph	   also	   includes,	   as	   “Period	   0,”	   the	   average	   Stage	   1	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performance	  of	   leaders	  and	  workers	   in	   the	   respective	   conditions;	   consistent	  with	  our	  earlier	  analysis,	  these	  means	  are	  statistically	  indistinguishable.	  	  In	   the	   Inactive	  Leader	   condition,	   average	   reported	  performance	   is	   fairly	   stable	  over	   time,	  with	   only	   a	   slight	   upward	   trend,	   and	   the	   average	   reported	  performance	   is	  generally	   similar	   to	   that	   from	   Stage	   1.	   Thus,	   while	   there	   is	   some	   evidence	   of	  misreporting	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  active	  leaders,	  its	  incidence	  does	  not	  change	  much	  over	  time—with	  the	  exception,	  perhaps,	  of	  the	  last	  period—and	  remains	  relatively	  modest	  in	  magnitude.	  	  In	   contrast,	   reported	   performance	   is	   higher	   and	   increases	  more	   strongly	   over	  time	  in	  conditions	  with	  an	  active	  leader.	  This	  upward	  trend	  in	  reported	  performance	  is	  stronger	  for	  groups	  with	  leaders	  classified	  as	  dishonest.14	  Considering	  average	  reported	  performance	  across	  all	  periods,	  we	  observe	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  groups	  led	  by	  active	  leaders	  classified	  as	  dishonest	  and	  those	  led	  by	  other	  active	  leaders	  (4.82	  vs.	  4.54,	  two-­‐sided	  Mann	  Whitney	  test,	  p<0.001).15	  	  We	   test	   the	   relationship	   between	   leaders’	   honesty	   and	   followers’	   behavior	   in	  Table	   3.	   We	   regress,	   using	   a	   tobit	   specification	   with	   subject	   random	   effects,16	   the	  reported	   performance	   of	   workers	   in	   Stage	   2	   on	   variables	   related	   to	   the	   leadership	  condition,	  on	  a	   time	  trend,	  and	  on	  workers’	   initial	  propensity	   to	  act	  honestly.	  We	  also	  control	   for	   the	   overall	   level	   of	   cheating	   within	   the	   worker’s	   firm—measured	   by	   the	  worker’s	  firm’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  in	  the	  previous	  period	  (𝑠!)—and	  within	  the	  session—measured	  by	   the	  size	  of	   the	  prize	   in	   the	  previous	  period	  (𝑉)	  relative	   to	   the	  maximum	  possible	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  (1250).	  Results	  of	  Model	  1	  indicate	  that	  dishonest	  leaders	  and	  active	  leaders	  generate	  more	  unethical	  conduct.	  Moreover,	  workers	  who	  report	  higher	  performance	  in	  Stage	  1	  also	  tend	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  second	  stage.	  The	  time	  trend	  in	  Figure	  1	  is	   also	   confirmed	   by	   Model	   1,	   as	   dishonesty	   significantly	   increases	   over	   time.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	   These	   trends	   in	   reported	   performance	   generally	   correspond	   to	   an	   opposite	   pattern	   in	   payoffs	   (see	  Figure	  A.3	  in	  the	  Appendix).	  Average	  payoffs	  decrease	  only	  slightly	  over	  time	  with	  inactive	  leaders,	  and	  more	  strongly	  with	  active	  leaders.	  However,	  groups	  with	  dishonest	  active	  leaders	  receive	  slightly	  higher	  average	  profits	  than	  those	  with	  honest	  leaders.	  	  15	  As	  a	  placebo	  test,	  we	  would	  not	  expect	  dishonest	  leaders	  to	  affect	  reported	  performance	  in	  the	  Inactive	  Leader	   condition.	   Indeed,	   average	   reported	  performance	  does	  not	   differ	   significantly	   between	  workers	  who	   are	   led	   by	   dishonest	   leaders	   and	   those	  who	   are	   not	   (4.25	   vs.	   4.29,	   two-­‐sided	  Mann	  Whitney	   test:	  p=0.76).	  16	   Throughout	   the	   paper,	  we	  use	   censored	   regression	  models	  when	  we	   analyze	   reported	  performance,	  since	   this	   variable	   is	   censored	   from	   below	   at	   1	   and	   from	   above	   at	   6.	   The	   results	   do	   not	   change,	  qualitatively,	  if	  we	  use	  linear	  regression	  models	  or	  ordered	  probit	  models.	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additional	  controls	  show	  that	  having	  received	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  in	  the	  previous	  period	  is	  associated	  with	  higher	  reported	  performance	  and	  that	  lower	  overall	  levels	  of	  cheating	  in	  a	  session	  are	  correlated	  with	  lower	  reported	  performance.	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Leaders’	  honesty	  and	  reported	  performance	  
Note:	  Random	  effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%. 	  Model	  2	  adds	  an	   interaction	   term	   for	  active	  and	  dishonest	   leaders.	  The	   results	  show	   that	   leaders	   who	   are	   both	   active	   and	   dishonest	   drive	   the	   increase	   in	   reported	  performance.	   That	   is,	   the	   significant	   increase	   in	   performance	   is	   caused	   entirely	   by	  dishonest	   leaders	  who	   have	   channels	   of	   influence	   at	   their	   disposal.	  Model	   3	   includes	  
Dependent	  variable Stage	  2	  performance	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	  Dishonest	  leader	  (Leader's	  stage	  1	  perf	  =	  6)	   0.681***	  (0.237)	   -­‐0.264	  (0.521)	   -­‐1.066	  (0.760)	  Active	  leader	   0.503**	  (0.248)	   0.240	  (0.278)	   -­‐0.355	  (0.405)	  Dishonest	  leader	  *	  Active	  leader	   	   1.188**	  (0.587)	   1.537*	  (0.855)	  Period	   0.138***	  (0.022)	   0.138***	  (0.022)	   0.043	  (0.042)	  Dishonest	  leader	  *	  Period	   	   	   0.134	  (0.093)	  Active	  leader*	  Period	   	   	   0.104**	  (0.051)	  Dishonest	  leader	  *	  Active	  leader	  *	  Period	   	   	   -­‐0.055	  (0.105)	  Stage	  1	  performance	  of	  worker	   0.333***	  (0.071)	   0.347***	  (0.071)	   0.348***	  (0.071)	  Previous	  period	  group	  share	  of	  prize	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4.592***	  (1.522)	   4.537***	  (1.521)	   4.353***	  (1.520)	  Previous	  period	  prize	  as	  share	  of	  max	  prize	   -­‐0.898*	  (0.527)	   -­‐0.897*	  (0.527)	   -­‐0.600	  (0.538)	  Constant	   2.183***	  (0.687)	   2.316***	  (0.689)	   2.673***	  (0.703)	  Number	  of	  Obs	  	  	  	   2160	   2160	   2160	  Log	  Likelihood	  	  	   -­‐3349.88	   -­‐3347.84	   -­‐3343.17	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additional	   time	   trend	   measures.	   The	   coefficient	   for	   dishonest	   and	   active	   leaders	  remains	   large,	   and	   marginally	   statistically	   significant.	   Interestingly,	   the	   interaction	  between	   active	   leaders	   and	   period	   is	   now	   significant,	   indicating	   that	   workers	   in	  conditions	  where	  there	  are	  active	  leaders	  develop	  greater	  dishonesty	  over	  time,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  in	  groups	  with	  leaders	  who	  we	  do	  not	  categorize	  as	  dishonest.	  	  	  
3.3 How	  do	  leaders	  affect	  workers’	  honesty?	  	   Having	  established	  that	  leadership	  can	  influence	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  workers	  act	  dishonestly,	  we	  next	   investigate	  how	  leaders	  affect	  workers’	  behavior	  and	  the	  relative	  importance	   of	   two	   alternative	   channels	   through	   which	   such	   influence	   potentially	  operates.	  For	  this,	  we	  exploit	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  laboratory	  environment,	  where	  we	  can	  turn	  off	  one	  channel	  while	  leaving	  the	  other	  active.	  	  Figure	  2	  shows	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  across	  periods	  in	  each	  of	  the	  four	   conditions,	   where	   leaders	   can	   influence	   financial	   incentives	   (Leader	   Incentives	  Only),	   leaders	  can	  make	  statements	  (Leader	  Statements	  Only),	   leaders	  have	  the	  power	  to	  do	  both	  (Leader),	  and	  leaders	  have	  a	  purely	  passive	  role	  (Inactive	  Leader).	  Again,	  we	  include	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  of	  all	   subjects	   in	   the	   first	  stage,	  denoted	  as	  “Period	  0.”	  	  	  
Figure	  2:	  Average	  group	  performance	  over	  time,	  all	  conditions	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Qualitatively,	  the	  figure	  indicates	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  public	  statements	  is	  a	  more	   important	   channel	   through	   which	   leaders	   influence	   groups	   than	   the	   ability	   to	  determine	   incentives.	   Average	   reported	   performance	   when	   leaders	   can	   only	   make	  statements	   to	   workers	   largely	   overlaps	   that	   of	   groups	   in	   the	   Leader	   condition.	   In	  contrast,	   both	   the	   level	   and	   the	   trend	   of	   group	   performance	   in	   the	   Leader	   Incentives	  Only	   condition	   follow	   closely	   that	   of	   groups	   in	   the	   Inactive	   Leader	   condition.17	   These	  results	   suggest	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   leadership	   on	   cheating	   derives	  mainly	   from	   leaders’	  ability	  to	  make	  statements	  to	  workers,	  rather	  than	  from	  their	  power	  to	  reward	  workers’	  reported	  performance.18	  Table	   4	   reports	   results	   from	   random-­‐effects	   tobit	   regressions	   of	   workers’	  individual	  performance.	  Model	  1	  includes	  a	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  the	  leader	  can	  communicate,	  another	   indicating	  the	  ability	  to	  allocate	  rewards,	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  these	   two	   variables	   identifying	   when	   the	   leader	   can	   do	   both.	   The	   regression	   also	  controls	   for	   workers’	   reported	   performance	   in	   Stage	   1.	   The	   results	   confirm	   that	   the	  ability	  to	  make	  public	  statements	  is	  the	  primary	  channel	  through	  which	  active	  leaders	  produce	  increased	  dishonesty,	  by	  0.75	  points,	  in	  Stage	  2.	  The	  effect	  of	  incentive	  power	  on	   reported	   performance	   is	   small	   and	   statistically	   insignificant.	   Combining	   leaders’	  ability	   to	   communicate	   and	   allocate	   rewards	   further	   increases	   cheating,	   but	   not	   in	   a	  statistically	  significant	  way.	  Model	  2	  adds	  time	  variables,	  period	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  period	  with	  the	  different	  conditions.	  Performance	  in	  early	  periods	  does	  not	  significantly	  differ	  across	   conditions—i.e.,	   the	   condition-­‐specific	   indicator	  variables	   (intercepts)	  do	  not	   differ	   significantly—and	   cheating	   tends	   to	   increase	   over	   time	   in	   all	   conditions.	  However,	   reported	   performance	   increases	   at	   an	   even	   higher	   rate	   over	   time	   when	  leaders	   can	   make	   statements	   to	   workers,	   as	   shown	   by	   the	   positive	   and	   significant	  coefficient	  on	  the	  interaction	  term	  between	  period	  and	  the	  Leader	  statements	  variable.	  Leaders’	  power	  to	  reward	  workers	  for	  their	  performance	  does	  not	  cause	  any	  additional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	  Table	  B.4	  in	  the	  Appendix,	  we	  compare	  reported	  performance	  between	  conditions.	  Two-­‐sided	  Mann	  Whitney	  tests	  show	  that	  reported	  performance	  is	  significantly	  different	  between	  the	  Inactive	  Leader	  and	  the	  Leader	  Statements	  Only	  and	  Leader	  conditions	  (p=0.000	  and	  p=0.000)	  as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  Leader	  Incentives	  Only	  and	  the	  Leader	  Statements	  Only	  and	  Leader	  conditions	  (p=0.000	  and	  p=0.000).	  But	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  Inactive	  Leader	  and	  Leader	  Incentives	  Only	  condition	  is	  insignificant	  (p=0.734)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Leader	  Statements	  Only	  and	  the	  Leader	  condition	  (p=0.144).	  18	  Aggregate	  payoffs	  follow	  a	  similar	  pattern:	  they	  are	  lowest	  and	  decrease	  at	  a	  faster	  rate	  in	  the	  Leader	  Statements	  Only	  and	  Leader	  conditions,	  while	  the	  Inactive	  Leader	  and	  Leader	  Incentives	  Only	  conditions	  also	  display	  overlapping	  trends,	  with	  higher	  and	  more	  constant	  payoffs	  over	  time.	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increase	   in	   cheating	   over	   time,	   neither	  when	   it	   is	   leaders’	   only	   ability,	   nor	  when	   it	   is	  combined	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  statements.	  	  	  
Table	  4:	  Performance	  by	  treatment	  
Dependent	  variable	  	   Stage	  2	  performance	  (1)	   (2)	  Leader	  statements	  only	   0.750**	  (0.296)	   0.021	  (0.384)	  Leader	  incentives	  only	  	   -­‐0.099	  (0.295)	   -­‐0.303	  (0.382)	  Leader	  (statements	  x	  incentives)	  	   0.363	  (0.419)	   0.299	  (0.543)	  Period	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   0.063**	  (0.032)	  Leader	  statements	  only	  *Period	   	   0.138***	  (0.046)	  Leader	  incentives	  only	  *Period	  	   	   0.038	  (0.045)	  Leader	  *Period	   	   0.014	  (0.065)	  Stage	  1	  performance	  	   0.362***	  (0.070)	   0.362***	  (0.070)	  Constant	   3.185***	  (0.381)	   2.830***	  (0.419)	  Number	  of	  Obs	   2400	   2400	  Log	  Likelihood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐3806.52	   -­‐3753.25	  Note:	  Random-­‐effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%.	  	   Thus,	   confirming	  what	  we	  observed	   in	   Figure	  2,	   the	   ability	   of	   leaders	   to	  make	  public	  statements	  has	  a	  much	  stronger	  influence	  on	  unethical	  conduct	  than	  the	  ability	  to	  distribute	   financial	   rewards.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   we	   study	   these	   specific	   tools	   more	  thoroughly,	  including	  how	  leaders	  employ	  them	  and	  their	  direct	  effect	  on	  behavior.	  	  
3.4 Strategies	  employed	  by	  leaders	  We	   next	   investigate	   more	   precisely	   how	   the	   strategies	   employed	   by	   leaders	  affect	  workers’	  behavior.	  We	  begin	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  distribute	  financial	  incentives	  and	  then	  analyze	  the	  role	  of	  statements.	  	  In	  conditions	  with	  leader	  incentive	  power,	  leaders	  can	  choose	  how	  to	  distribute	  rewards	   among	   workers,	   after	   observing	   their	   reported	   performance.	   Leaders	   can	  either	   reward	   high	   or	   low	   reported	   performance,	   thus	   implicitly	   encouraging	   a	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particular	   behavior,	   or	   they	   can	   distribute	   the	   bonus	   independently	   of	   workers’	  performance	   reports.	   At	   the	   level	   of	   a	   particular	   leader,	   the	   correlation	   between	   the	  bonuses	  allocated	  by	  the	  leader	  and	  workers’	  reported	  performance	  captures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  leader	  rewards	  and	  encourages	  misreporting.	  We	  therefore	  construct,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  leaders’	  use	  of	  incentives	  to	  encourage	  dishonesty	  up	  to	  a	  particular	  period,	  a	  variable	  equal	  to	  the	  average	  correlation	  between	  rewards	  and	  reported	  performance	  in	  the	  worker’s	  group	  up	  to	  that	  period.	  This	  variable	  ranges	  from	  -­‐1	  to	  +1.	  A	  positive	  value	  indicates	  that	  a	  leader	  provides	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  bonus	  to	  workers	  reporting	  high	   performance,	   a	   negative	   value	   indicates	   that	   the	   leader	   rewards	   low	   reported	  performance,	   and	   a	   value	   of	   0	   indicates	   that	   the	   leader	   distributes	   the	   bonus	  independently	   of	   reported	   performance.	   The	   average	   measure	   across	   all	   leaders,	  cumulatively	  through	  the	  last	  period	  equals	  0.095.	  	  	  
Table	  5:	  Reported	  performance	  and	  leader’s	  incentive	  use	  
Dependent	  variable	  	   Stage	  2	  performance	  (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  Correlation	  between	  reward	  and	  performance	  up	  to	  previous	  period	   1.313***	  (0.219)	   1.123***	  (0.215)	   1.006***	  (0.217)	  Previous	  period	  performance	  	   	   0.263**	  (0.130)	   0.036	  (0.143)	  Previous	  period	  reward	  	   	   -­‐0.006	  (0.015)	   -­‐0.013	  (0.015)	  Previous	  period	  performance*Reward	  	   	   0.002	  (0.004)	   0.003	  (0.004)	  Previous	  period	  prize	  as	  share	  of	  max	  prize	  	   	   	   -­‐2.206***	  (0.667)	  Previous	  period	  group	  share	  of	  prize	  	   	   	   6.036**	  (2.397)	  Constant	   5.225***	  (0.149)	   4.025***	  (0.566)	   5.456***	  (0.853)	  Number	  of	  Obs	  	  	  	   1080	   1080	   1080	  Log	  likelihood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐1681.76	   -­‐1666.83	   -­‐1659.97	  Note:	  Random	  effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%.	  	   	   	  Table	   5	   reports	   results	   from	   random-­‐effects	   tobit	   regressions	   of	   workers’	  performance	   in	  a	  period	  on	  this	  correlation	  up	  to	  the	  previous	  period.	  Model	  1	  shows	  that	   a	   higher	   past	   correlation	   between	   rewards	   and	   reported	   performance	   yields	  greater	  misreporting.	  Model	  2	  shows	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	   leader’s	  rewarding	  strategy	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on	  reported	  performance	  remains	  significant	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  worker’s	  previous	  period	  performance,	  the	  bonus	  received	  by	  the	  worker	  in	  the	  previous	  period,	  and	  the	  interaction	   of	   these	   two	   variables.	   Model	   2	   also	   shows	   that	   workers	   who	   reported	  higher	  scores	  in	  the	  previous	  period	  are	  likely	  to	  again	  report	  high	  scores.	  In	  Model	  3,	  our	   main	   result	   does	   not	   change	   if	   we	   control	   for	   the	   overall	   level	   of	   cheating	   that	  occurs	   within	   the	   session	   and	   in	   the	   worker’s	   specific	   firm.	   Thus,	   from	   Table	   5,	   we	  observe	  that	  leaders’	  use	  of	  incentives	  can	  significantly	  influence	  misreporting.	  The	  fact	  that,	   as	   we	   saw	   earlier,	   such	   incentive	   power	   does	   not	   significantly	   increase	  misreporting	   is	   likely	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   leaders	   do	   not,	   generally,	   use	   incentives	   to	  encourage	  misreporting.	  Recall	  that	  the	  average	  correlation	  between	  bonus	  allocations	  to	  workers	  and	  their	  reported	  performance,	  across	  all	  leaders,	  is	  close	  to	  zero.	  	  	  We	   next	   explore	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   content	   of	   leaders’	   statements	   on	   workers’	  reported	  performance.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  conducted	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  content	  of	  leaders’	  messages,	  relying	  on	  message	  classifications	  by	  three	  independent	  coders.	  The	  authors	  initially	   developed	   categories	   that	   distinguish,	   first	   of	   all,	   between	   messages	  encouraging	   high	   and	   low	   reported	   performance.	   Categories	   also	   further	   identify	  whether	   the	   message	   contains	   a	   direct	   request,	   praises	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   past	  performance	  report,	   refers	   to	  a	  reward	   for	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  reported	  performance,	  or	  makes	  a	  direct	  appeal	  to	  honesty	  or	  dishonesty.	  Coders	  observed	  the	  statement	  made	  by	  a	   particular	   leader	   in	   a	   period,	   and	   then	   identified	   which	   categories	   applied	   to	   that	  particular	   statement.	   In	   the	   following	   analysis	   we	   use	   the	   median	   of	   the	   answers	  provided	  by	  the	  coders.19	  	  Table	   6	   reports	   results	   from	   random-­‐effects	   tobit	   regressions	   of	   workers’	  reported	  performance	  in	  a	  period	  on	  the	  type	  of	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  leader	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  period.	  Model	  1	  explores	  the	  effect	  of	  leaders’	  explicitly	  requesting	  high	  or	  low	  performance	   from	  workers	   (request	  high	   and	  request	   low),	  Model	  2	  of	  praises	   for	  high	  or	  low	  past	  performance	  (praise	  high	  and	  praise	  low),	  Model	  3	  of	  messages	  linking	  reward	   to	   high	   or	   low	   performance	   (reward	   high	   and	   reward	   low),	   and	   Model	   4	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Table	  B.4	   in	   the	  Appendix	  reports	  all	  message	  categories,	   their	  definitions,	  and	   frequencies.	  The	   first	  eight	   categories	   are	   the	   ones	   that	   we	   believed,	   ex	   ante,	   would	   be	   the	   most	   relevant,	   so	   we	   focus	   our	  analysis	   on	   these.	   For	   completeness,	   we	   also	   included	   additional	   categories,	   not	   used	   in	   the	   current	  analysis,	  that	  identify	  messages	  referring	  to	  other	  groups’	  performance,	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  or	  to	  the	  group’s	   share	   of	   the	   prize,	   and	   residual	   categories	   for	   messages	   containing	   apologies,	   jokes,	   general	  encouragement,	  or	  miscellaneous	  messages.	  Including	  these	  additional	  categories	  in	  the	  analysis	  does	  not	  substantively	  change	  our	  results	  (see	  Table	  B.5	  in	  the	  Appendix).	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messages	  referring	  to	  honesty	  or	  dishonesty	  (honest	  and	  dishonest).	  Model	  5	  combines	  all	   types	   of	   messages	   in	   the	   same	   regression,	   and	   Model	   6	   controls	   for	   leaders’	  rewarding	  strategy,	  by	   including	   the	  correlation	  between	  reward	  and	  performance	  up	  to	   the	   previous	   period,	   i.e.,	   the	   variable	   from	   Table	   5.	   All	   regressions	   control	   for	   the	  amount	   of	  misreporting	   occurring	  within	   the	   session	   and	   the	   group,	   captured	   by	   the	  relative	  size	  of	   the	  prize	  and	  by	   the	  group’s	  share	  of	   the	  prize	   in	   the	  previous	  period,	  respectively,	  and	  for	  the	  worker’s	  reported	  performance	  in	  the	  previous	  period.	  Models	  3	  and	  6	  consider	  only	  observations	   from	  the	  Leader	  condition,	  as	  this	   is	   the	  condition	  with	  Leader-­‐determined	  incentives,	  while	  other	  models	  include	  observations	  from	  both	  conditions	  that	  allow	  leader	  statements	  (Leader	  and	  Leader	  Statements	  Only).	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Reported	  performance	  and	  content	  of	  leader	  statements	  
Dependent	  variable	   Stage	  2	  performance	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  Request	  high	   0.914***	   	   	   	   0.588***	   0.754***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.191)	   	   	   	   (0.217)	   (0.285)	  Request	  low	   -­‐1.313***	   	   	   	   -­‐1.205***	   -­‐1.812***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.220)	   	   	   	   (0.223)	   (0.354)	  Praise	  high	   	   0.039	   	   	   0.000	   -­‐0.335	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   (0.227)	   	   	   (0.219)	   (0.302)	  Praise	  low	   	   -­‐0.390	   	   	   -­‐0.226	   -­‐0.197	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   (0.359)	   	   	   (0.340)	   (0.475)	  Reward	  high	   	   	   0.926***	   	   0.603*	   0.343	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   (0.352)	   	   (0.328)	   (0.339)	  Reward	  low	   	   	   -­‐2.975***	   	   -­‐1.994***	   -­‐1.672**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   (0.664)	   	   (0.653)	   (0.668)	  Dishonest	   	   	   	   0.628***	   0.366*	   0.300	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   (0.186)	   (0.202)	   (0.285)	  Honest	  	  	  	   	   	   	   -­‐0.721***	   -­‐0.758***	   -­‐1.280***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   (0.272)	   (0.263)	   (0.371)	  Correlation	  btw	  reward	  and	  perf	  up	  to	  previous	  period	   	   	   	   	   	   0.641	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.397)	  Previous	  period	  performance	   0.195**	   0.190**	   0.260*	   0.187**	   0.186**	   0.286**	  (0.089)	   (0.092)	   (0.141)	   (0.091)	   (0.087)	   (0.134)	  Previous	  period	  prize	  as	  share	  of	  max	  prize	   -­‐1.461*	   -­‐2.482***	   -­‐1.508	   -­‐2.334***	   -­‐1.225	   0.077	  (0.768)	   (0.797)	   (1.093)	   (0.785)	   (0.776)	   (1.073)	  Previous	  period	  group	  share	  of	  prize	   2.386	   2.410	   9.690**	   2.539	   2.327	   9.316**	  (2.876)	   (2.994)	   (3.992)	   (2.946)	   (2.875)	   (3.825)	  Constant	   5.142***	   6.237***	   3.828***	   5.932***	   5.121***	   2.514**	  	   (0.748)	   (0.778)	   (1.097)	   (0.765)	   (0.744)	   (1.020)	  Number	  of	  Obs	  	  	  	   1080	   1080	   540	   1080	   1080	   540	  Log	  Likelihood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐1531.14	   -­‐1561.46	   -­‐745.21	   -­‐1553.35	   -­‐1521.00	   -­‐717.45	  Note:	  Random	  effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   regression	   coefficients	   confirm	   the	   influence	   of	   leaders’	   statements:	  workers’	   reported	   performance	   generally	   increases	   when	   leaders	   send	   messages	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encouraging	  high	  performance	  and	  decreases	  when	  leaders	  encourage	  honesty	  or	  lower	  performance	   reports.	   Regardless	   of	   the	   specific	   strategy	   used,	   statements	   asking	   for	  lower	  levels	  of	  performance	  appear	  at	  least	  as	  effective	  as	  those	  asking	  for	  high	  scores,	  reflected	   in	   the	   relative	   magnitude	   of	   coefficients	   associated	   with	   “high”	   and	   “low”	  statements.	  	  Models	  5	  and	  6	  allow	  us	  to	  compare	  the	  relative	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	   statements.	   Statements	   directly	   requesting	   a	   certain	   performance	   report,	   those	  associating	  reward	  to	  lower	  performance	  reports	  and	  direct	  appeals	  to	  honesty	  appear	  to	  have	  the	   largest	   influence	  on	  workers’	  behavior.	  Such	  statements	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  that	   retain	   statistical	   significance	   when	   all	   strategies	   are	   included	   in	   the	   same	  regression.	  	  Model	  6	  confirms	  that,	   in	  our	  experiment,	   leaders’	  statements	  continue	  to	  have	  large	   influence	  on	  worker	  behavior,	   even	  after	   accounting	   for	   the	   effect	   of	   incentives.	  Indeed,	  when	  controlling	   for	   leaders’	   statements,	   the	  correlation	  between	  reward	  and	  performance	   only	   marginally	   significantly	   affects	   workers’	   reported	   performance.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   magnitude	   and	   significance	   of	   coefficients	   associated	   with	   leader’s	  statements	  are	  robust	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  leaders’	  rewarding	  behavior	  as	  a	  control.20	  	  As	  a	  complement	  to	  the	  statistical	  analyses	  in	  Tables	  5	  and	  6,	  Figure	  3	  shows	  the	  relationships	  between	  how	   leaders	  use	   incentives	   (panel	  A)	  and	  statements	   (panel	  B)	  and	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  in	  the	  leader’s	  firm	  across	  all	  10	  periods.	  More	  precisely,	  panel	  A	  depicts,	  for	  each	  leader,	  the	  average	  performance-­‐reward	  correlation	  across	  all	   ten	  periods	  (horizontal	  axis)	  and	  the	  corresponding	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  across	  all	  ten	  periods	  (vertical	  axis).	  The	  two	  kinds	  of	  markers	  identify	  the	  Leader	  and	   the	  Leader	   Incentives	  Only	  conditions.	  Panel	  B	  uses	   the	   same	  variable	   for	  the	  vertical	  axis,	  but	  the	  horizontal	  axis	  measures	  a	  general	  tendency	  to	  use	  messages	  encouraging	   high	   performance	   reports—more	   precisely,	   the	   relative	   proportions	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  In	  contrast	  with	  the	  analysis	  in	  Table	  5,	  the	  regression	  in	  Model	  6	  of	  Table	  6	  also	  restricts	  the	  sample	  to	  only	   observations	   in	   the	   Leader	   condition—where	   both	   statements	   and	   incentives	   are	   available	   to	   a	  leader.	   Table	   5	   also	   includes	   all	   observations	   in	   the	   Leader	   Incentives	   Only	   condition.	   Running	   the	  regressions	  of	  Table	  5	   for	   the	  Leader	   condition	  only,	  we	   find	   that	   the	   coefficients	  on	   the	  performance-­‐reward	  correlation	  variable	  are	  lower	  in	  magnitude,	  by	  about	  0.25	  points,	  and	  their	  standard	  errors	  are	  twice	  as	  large.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  statistically	  insignificant	  effect	  of	  leaders’	  rewarding	  strategy	  when	  controls	  are	   included	   (results	   are	   shown	   in	  Table	  B.6	   in	   the	  Appendix).	  The	   lack	  of	   significance	   is	  partly	  due	   to	  lower	   power	   and	   also	   likely	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   communication	   matters	   more	   than	   the	   ability	   to	   reward	  performance	   when	   both	   channels	   are	   available	   to	   leaders.	   See	   also	   Table	   B.7	   in	   the	   Appendix,	   which	  shows	  the	  regression	  models	  of	  Table	  6	  only	  using	  observations	  from	  the	  Leader	  condition.	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“high”	   and	   “low”	   messages.21	   The	   two	   kinds	   of	   markers	   identify,	   separately,	   the	   two	  conditions	   in	   which	   statements	   were	   possible	   (Leader	   and	   Leader	   Statements	   Only).	  The	   graphs	   reveal	   positive	   relationships	   in	   all	   conditions.	   Moreover,	   the	   correlation	  between	  the	  employed	  strategies	  and	  average	  performance	  is	  positive	  and	  significant	  in	  both	  panels	  (Incentives:	  r	  =	  0.38,	  p=0.02;	  Statements:	  r	  =	  0.57,	  p	  =	  0.0001).	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distributed	  more	   evenly	   between	   leaders	   who	   encourage	   and	   discourage	   dishonesty,	  without	  a	  systematic	   tendency	   toward	  one	   type	  of	  behavior	  or	   the	  other.	  Hence,	  even	  though	   leaders	   can	   influence	   behavior	   through	   the	   distribution	   of	   incentives,	   they	  generally	  do	  not	   tend	   to	  do	   so	   in	  one	  particular	  direction.	  But,	  with	   their	   statements,	  leaders	  tend	  to	  strongly	  encourage	  misreporting.	  	  
3.5 Strategies	  employed	  by	  unethical	  leaders	  We	   next	   investigate	   the	   specific	   strategies	   employed	   by	   those	   leaders	   we	  classified	   as	   unethical—i.e.,	   those	   who	   reported	   performance	   of	   6	   in	   Stage	   1.	   In	  particular,	   we	   study	   whether	   unethical	   leaders	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   employ	   strategies	  encouraging	  unethical	  conduct	  than	  are	  other	  leaders.	  	  Figure	  4	  depicts	  the	  relationship	  between	  leaders’	  dishonesty	  and	  their	  behavior.	  Panel	  A	  shows	  the	  mean	  share	  of	  “high”	  statements	  made	  by	  leaders	  across	  Stage	  2.	  The	  use	  of	   statements	  encouraging	  dishonesty	   is	   significantly	  higher	   for	  dishonest	   leaders	  (two-­‐sided	  Mann	  Whitney	  test:	  p=0.047).	  In	  Panel	  B,	  we	  find	  that	  a	  similar	  relationship	  holds	   for	   how	   the	   two	   types	   of	   leaders	   employ	   incentives.	   While	   most	   leaders,	   on	  average,	   exhibit	   no	   systematic	   relationship	   between	   the	   allocation	   of	   rewards	   and	  workers’	   reported	   performance	   (r=-­‐0.02,	   p=0.645),	   the	   relationship	   is	   positive	   and	  significant	  for	  dishonest	  leaders	  (r=0.29,	  p=0.0001).	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Leader’s	  honesty	  and	  leader	  behavior	  A:	  Statements	  encouraging	  dishonesty	   B:	  Incentives	  encouraging	  dishonesty	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Table	   7	   reports	   results	   from	   random-­‐effects	   linear	   regressions	   of	   leaders’	  strategies	  on	  the	  indicator	  of	  leader	  dishonesty,	  period,	  the	  firm’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize,	  and	  size	   of	   the	   overall	   prize	   relative	   to	   the	  maximum	   prize.	   Dependent	   variables	   are	   the	  share	   of	   statements	   made	   by	   the	   leader	   requesting	   high	   performance	   in	   a	   period	   in	  Model	   1,	   and	   the	   correlation	   between	   rewards	   allocated	   by	   the	   leader	   and	   workers’	  performance	  in	  a	  period	  in	  Model	  2.	  Model	  1	  considers	  all	  groups	  in	  conditions	  allowing	  leader	  statements,	  Model	  2	  those	  groups	  in	  incentives	  conditions.23	  	  
Table	  7:	  Leaders’	  honesty,	  context	  and	  leaders'	  behavior	  
Dependent	  variable	   Share	  of	  high	  
messages	  
Correlation	  btw	  reward	  
and	  performance	  
	   (1)	   (2)	  Dishonest	  leader	  	   0.113**	   0.181	  	   (0.057)	   (0.141)	  Period	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.019**	   0.013	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.008)	   (0.017)	  Group	  share	  of	  prizea	   0.296	   -­‐1.151	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.441)	   (1.020)	  Prize	  as	  share	  of	  max	  prizea	   -­‐0.180	   0.535*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.183)	   (0.303)	  Constant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.691***	   -­‐0.217	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.196)	   (0.321)	  Number	  of	  Obsb	  	  	  	   290	   400	  R-­‐squared	   0.08	   0.01	  Note:	  Random	  effects	   linear	  regression.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	   in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	   	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%.	  a	  Refers	  to	  previous	  period	  in	  Model	  1	  (messages	  are	  sent	  at	  start	  of	   period)	   and	   to	   current	   period	   in	   Model	   2	   (rewards	   are	   given	   at	   end	   of	   period).	   b	   The	   number	   of	  observations	  is	  reduced	  to	  290	  in	  Model	  1,	  since	  there	  are	  70	  instances	  within	  periods	  2-­‐10	  where	  neither	  a	  high	  nor	  a	  low	  message	  was	  sent	  	  Leaders	   who	   likely	   misreported	   their	   performance	   in	   Stage	   1,	   i.e.,	   dishonest	  leaders,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  encourage	  cheating	  through	  their	  statements.	  They	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  reward	  workers	  who	  reported	  high	  performance,	  but	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  relationship	   is	   not	   statistically	   significant	   (p	   =	   0.197).	   The	   use	   of	   statements	  encouraging	  misreporting	  increases	  over	  time,	  while	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  relationship	  between	   time	   and	   the	   correlation	   between	   reward	   and	   performance.	   These	   different	  trends	  in	  the	  use	  of	  communication	  and	  rewarding	  strategies	  help	  explain	  why	  cheating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Since	  leaders	  send	  messages	  to	  workers	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  period,	  while	  they	  allocate	  rewards	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period,	  group	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  and	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  are	  lagged	  in	  Model	  1,	  while	  they	  refer	  to	  the	  current	  period	  in	  Model	  2.	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increases	   over	   time	   with	   leader	   statements,	   but	   not	   when	   leaders	   can	   distribute	  financial	  incentives.	  	  	  
3.6 Do	  leaders	  affect	  social	  norms	  of	  conduct?	  Finally,	  we	  also	  attempt	  to	  identify	  whether	  an	  effect	  of	  leadership	  on	  followers	  extends	  to	  a	  broader	  change	  in	  perceptions	  of	  appropriate	  an	  inappropriate	  conduct.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  included	  a	  measure,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  which	  elicited	  workers’	  social	  norms	  regarding	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  misreporting	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  die	  roll	  in	  Stage	  1.	  We	  used	  the	  incentivized	  norm	  elicitation	  method	  introduced	  by	  Krupka	  and	  Weber	   (2013).	   At	   the	   end	   of	   each	   session,	   subjects	   were	   asked	   to	   rate	   the	  appropriateness	   of	   overstating	   one’s	   performance	   in	   Stage	   1,	   on	   a	   scale	   from	   “very	  inappropriate”	  (1)	  to	  “very	  appropriate”	  (4).24	  Subjects	  were	  rewarded	  if	  their	  answer	  matched	   that	   of	   a	   randomly	   drawn	   other	   participant	   in	   the	   session.	   This	   procedure	  captures	   the	   social	   perceptions	   of	   appropriateness,	   a	   central	   component	   of	   injunctive	  social	  norms	  (see	  Burks	  and	  Krupka,	  2012;	  Krupka	  and	  Weber,	  2013).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Specifically,	  subjects	  were	  asked,	  “Suppose	  that,	  in	  Stage	  1,	  someone	  rolled	  a	  1	  on	  his	  or	  her	  die.	  How	  appropriate	  would	   it	  have	  been	   for	   that	  participant	   to	   report	  a	  higher	  number	   than	  1	   in	  Stage	  1	  of	   the	  experiment,	   when	   earnings	   were	   based	   on	   individual	   performance	   level	   and	   on	   the	   individual	  performance	   level	   of	   other	   participants?”	   and	   selected	   from	   four	   possible	   responses:	   “very	   socially	  inappropriate”	  (1),	  “somewhat	  socially	  inappropriate”	  (2),	  “somewhat	  socially	  appropriate”	  (3),	  and	  “very	  socially	  appropriate”	  (4).	  We	  also	  asked	  three	  additional	  questions,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  norms	  of	  behavior	  in	  Stage	   2	   and	   perceptions	   of	   specific	   group	   members	   (see	   instructions	   in	   Appendix	   D).	   Our	   primary	  interest,	  however,	  is	  in	  the	  broad	  perception	  captured	  by	  this	  first	  question. 	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Figure	  5:	  Effect	  of	  leadership	  on	  social	  appropriateness	  of	  misreporting	  	  
	  	  Figure	   5	   shows	   the	   mean	   reported	   rating	   of	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   inflating	  performance	  reports.	  Being	  in	  any	  condition	  with	  active	  leaders	  yields	  perceived	  norms	  of	   conduct	   that	   are	   more	   lax	   with	   respect	   to	   misreporting.	   That	   is,	   the	   difference	  between	   the	   Inactive	   Leader	   condition	   and	   the	   other	   three	   conditions	   is	   statistically	  significant.25	  Thus,	  exposure	  to	  a	  leader	  who	  has	  some	  channel	  through	  which	  to	  exert	  influence	  on	  the	  group	  changes	  workers’	  perceptions	  regarding	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  acting	   unethically	   in	   other	   environments,	  where	   the	   leader	   is	   not	   active.	   That	   is,	   our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  leaders	  do	  more	  than	  change	  behavior	  by	  exerting	  direct	  influence;	  they	  may	  also	  change	  norms	  and	  values.26	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that	  make	  causal	  inferences	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  leadership	  difficult.	  The	  laboratory	  environment	  allows	  us	  to	  address	  many	  of	  these	  concerns,	  while	  employing	  a	  task	  that	  incorporates	  features	  of	  real-­‐world	  unethical	  conduct.	  	  Our	  first	  main	  finding	  is	  clear	  evidence	  that	  unethical	  leaders	  produce	  unethical	  behavior	   on	   the	   part	   of	   followers.	   Even	   though	   we	   only	   observe	   Stage	   1	   unethical	  conduct	   imperfectly,	   a	   classification	   of	   leader	   “types”	   based	   on	   this	   behavior	   has	   a	  strong	  explanatory	  power	  for	  how	  much	  workers	  misreport	  their	  performance	  when	  in	  groups	  with	  active	  leaders.	  Two	  features	  of	  our	  experiment	  make	  this	  finding	  especially	  important.	   First,	   leaders	   are	   appointed	   at	   random,	   which	   means	   that	   the	   effect	   of	  unethical	  leaders	  on	  workers	  is	  causal—the	  selection	  and	  endogeneity	  issues	  present	  in	  the	  field	  are	  eliminated	  in	  our	  laboratory	  setting.	  Second,	  followers	  are	  never	  informed	  of	  the	  leader’s	  Stage	  1	  behavior.	  Thus,	  the	  effect	  of	  leaders	  must	  be	  through	  what	  actions	  they	  take	  in	  their	  functions	  as	  leaders—making	  statements	  to	  workers	  and	  distributing	  incentives.	  Indeed,	  we	  also	  show	  that	  leaders	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  misreported	  high	  performance	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  employ	  strategies	  that	  encourage	  misreporting,	   particularly	   communication,	   and	   that	   the	   use	   of	   such	   strategies	   yields	  unethical	  follower	  conduct.	  	  Our	   experimental	   design	   also	   allows	   us	   to	   compare	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	  how	  leaders	  use	  statements	  and	  incentives	  to	  influence	  followers.	  Our	  data	  indicate	  that	  “what	   leaders	   say”	   is	  more	   important	   than	   “what	   they	   pay”	   (cf.	   Brandts	   and	   Cooper,	  2007;	  Brandts,	  et	  al.,	  forthcoming).	  That	  is,	  leaders’	  ability	  to	  make	  public	  statements	  to	  followers—a	   common	   function	   of	   leadership—has	   a	   stronger	   effect	   on	   misreporting	  than	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  workers’	  earnings.	  The	  content	  of	  such	  statements	  directly	  influences	  unethical	  behavior:	   leaders	  who	  make	   statements	   indicative	  of	   a	  desire	   for	  more	  misreporting	   obtain	   such	   behavior,	  while	   those	  who	   request	   the	   opposite	   yield	  greater	   honesty.	   Moreover,	   the	   use	   of	   these	   two	   kinds	   of	   statements	   is	   highly	  asymmetric—leaders	   tend	   to	   employ	   more	   statements	   requesting	   higher	  “performance,”	   particularly	   over	   time,	   and	   this	   produces	   greater	   dishonesty	   among	  followers.	   While	   the	   ability	   to	   distribute	   incentives	   also	   has	   an	   effect	   on	   unethical	  conduct,	   leaders	   rely	   on	   this	  mechanism	   less	   to	   encourage	   unethical	   conduct,	   and	   its	  aggregate	  effect	  is	  therefore	  weaker.	  Importantly,	  we	  find	  that	  leaders’	  statements	  and	  incentive	  use	  can	  be	  effectively	  employed	  to	  change	  follower	  behavior	  in	  both	  directions;	  that	  is,	  both	  to	  increase	  and	  to	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decrease	  worker	  misreporting.	  Thus,	  both	  mechanisms	  present	  potential	  opportunities	  for	   leaders	   interested	   in	   curbing	   unethical	   conduct	   in	   their	   organization.	   The	   trick	  appears,	   largely,	   to	   get	   leaders	   to	   use	   these	   techniques	   at	   their	   disposal—and,	  particularly,	  to	  employ	  public	  statements	  that	  discourage	  unethical	  conduct.	  Our	  results	  suggest	   that	   a	   key	   aspect	   of	   this	   is	   finding	   the	   “right”	   leaders—i.e.,	   those	   who	   act	  ethically	   themselves	   and	   are	   likely	   to	   employ	   these	   instruments	   to	   encourage	   ethical,	  rather	  than	  unethical,	  employee	  conduct.	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A Appendix	  Figures	  	  
Figure	  A.1:	  Overview	  of	  the	  experimental	  design	  
	  
	  
Figure	  A.2:	  Distribution	  of	  reported	  performance	  by	  condition	  in	  Stage	  1	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Figure	  A.3:	  Average	  group	  payoffs	  over	  time	  
	  
	  
Figure	  A.4:	  Leaders'	  statement	  content	  over	  time	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B Appendix	  Tables	  	  
Table	  B.1:	  Summary	  statistics	  









Age	   20.51	  (2.96)	   21	  (3.51)	   19.72	  (1.99)	   20.49	  (3.28)	   20.65	  (2.54)	  Male	  (%)	   56.15	  (.50)	   50	  (.50)	   57.14	  (.49)	   60	  (.49)	   49.75	  (.50)	  Economics	  student	  (%)	   40.62	  (.49)	   42.5	  (.50)	   31.25	  (.47)	   48.75	  (.50)	   40	  (.49)	  Disposable	  monthly	  income	  (GBP)	   251	  (175)	   265	  (171)	   257	  (178)	   283	  (204)	   200	  (131)	  Big	  five	  conscientiousness	  	   50	  (9.29)	   51.67	  (8.83)	   49.18	  (10.23)	   48.67	  (9.67)	   50.48	  (7.99)	  
	  
Table	  B.2:	  Differences	  with	  expected	  distribution	  in	  Stage	  1	  	   	   Reported	  performance	  (in	  percent)	  
Condition	   N	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   mean	  Inactive	  Leader	   80	   3.8%***	   11.3%	   10.0%*	   20.0%	   18.8%	   36.3%†††	   4.48	  Leader	   80	   1.3%***	   8.8%**	   21.3%	   18.8%	   8.8%**	   41.3%†††	   4.49	  Statements	  	   80	   1.3%***	   8.8%**	   12.5%	   30.0%†††	   17.5%	   30.0%†††	   4.44	  Incentives	   80	   2.5%***	   10.0%*	   13.8%	   16.3%	   15.0%	   42.5%†††	   4.59	  Stars	   (crosses)	   refer	   to	   significance	   levels	   of	   one-­‐sided	   binomial	   probability	   test	   that	   the	   observed	  frequency	  is	  smaller	  (larger)	  than	  the	  expected	  frequency	  of	  16.7%.	  *(†)	  10%-­‐level,	  **(††)	  5%-­‐level,	  and	  ***	  (†††)	  1%-­‐level.	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Table	  B.3:	  Individual	  characteristics	  and	  performance	  in	  Stage	  1	  
Dependent	  variable	   Stage	  1	  performance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (1)	  Economics	  student	   0.554**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.266)	  Male	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.244***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.266)	  Age	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐0.116***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.032)	  Big	  Five	  conscientiousness	  score	   0.035**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.015)	  Constant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4.775***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (1.159)	  Number	  of	  Obs	  	  	  	   300	  Log-­‐likelihood	   -­‐489.40	  Notes:	  Random	  effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%.	  The	  number	  of	  observations	  is	  300	  instead	  of	  320	  (full	  sample),	  since	  we	  could	  not	  elicit	  the	  Big	  Five	  scores	  in	  one	  session	  because	  of	  technical	  problems.	  	  
Table	  B.4:	  Average	  reported	  performance	  in	  Stage	  2	  
	   Inactive	  	  
Leader	  
Leader	   Leader	  
Incentives	  Only	  
Leader	  
Statements	  Only	  Average	   4.28	   4.84	   4.29	   4.75	  Std.dev.	   1.65	   1.46	   1.53	   1.46	  N	   600	   600	   600	   660	  
	  
Table	  B.4:	  Message	  categories'	  definitions	  and	  use	  
Message	  type	   Definition	   Frequency	  Request	  high	   Supervisor	  requests	  an	  individual	  worker,	  several	  workers,	  or	  the	  entire	  group	  to	  report	  a	  high	  number,	  i.e.,	  a	  number	  that	  is	  higher	  than	  3.5	  on	  average.	   .57	  	  Request	  low	   Supervisor	  requests	  an	  individual	  worker,	  several	  workers,	  or	  the	  entire	  group	  to	  report	  a	  low	  number,	  i.e.,	  a	  number	  that	  is	  lower	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  3.5	  on	  average.	  
.17	  	  
Praise	  high	   Supervisor	  praises	  an	  individual,	  several	  individuals,	  or	  the	  entire	  group	  for	  reporting	  a	  high	  number,	  i.e.,	  a	  number	  that	  is	  higher	  than	  3.5	  on	  average.	   .16	  	  Praise	  low	   Supervisor	  praises	  an	  individual,	  several	  individuals,	  or	  the	  entire	  group	  for	  reporting	  a	  low	  number,	  i.e.,	  a	  number	  that	  is	  lower	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  3.5	  on	  average.	   .05	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Reward	  high	   Supervisor	  refers	  to	  how	  the	  bonus	  will	  be	  distributed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  gives	  workers	  a	  financial	  incentive	  to	  report	  a	  high	  number,	  i.e.,	  a	  number	  that	  is	  higher	  than	  3.5	  on	  average.	  
.19	  
Reward	  low	   Supervisor	  refers	  to	  how	  the	  bonus	  will	  be	  distributed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  gives	  workers	  a	  financial	  incentive	  to	  report	  a	  low	  number,	  i.e.,	  a	  number	  that	  is	  lower	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  3.5	  on	  average.	  
.03	  
Dishonest	   Supervisor	  refers	  to	  dishonest	  behavior	  in	  the	  message.	   .39	  Honest	   Supervisor	  refers	  to	  honest	  behavior	  in	  the	  message.	   .12	  Ref.	  other	  groups	   Supervisor	  refers	  to	  other	  groups,	  or	  other	  groups’	  behavior	  in	  a	  previous	  period.	   .42	  Ref.	  prize	   Supervisor	  refers	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  in	  a	  previous	  period.	   .24	  Ref.	  earnings	   Supervisor	  refers	  to	  the	  group’s	  earnings	  in	  a	  previous	  period.	   .31	  Humor	   Supervisor	  makes	  a	  joke	  or	  the	  message	  is	  ironic	  or	  humorous.	   .13	  Apology	   Supervisor	  apologizes	  for	  his	  or	  her	  messages	  or	  bonus	  distribution	  in	  a	  previous	  period.	   .04	  Encouragement	   Supervisor	  sends	  a	  message	  that	  includes	  a	  form	  of	  general	  encouragement.	   .36	  Miscellaneous	   Supervisor	  sends	  a	  message	  that	  does	  not	  belong	  in	  any	  of	  the	  other	  categories.	   .07	  No	  message	   Supervisor	  sends	  no	  message.	   .07	  Note:	  Frequency	  is	  defined	  as	  number	  of	  messages	  per	  group	  and	  period	  divided	  by	  the	  total	  number	  of	  messages,	  which	  is	  400	  messages	  for	  the	  Leader	  and	  Leader	  Statements	  Only	  conditions.	  The	  bonus	  categories	  refer	  only	  to	  observations	  of	  the	  Leader	  condition	  with	  a	  total	  number	  of	  200	  messages.	  The	  messages	  were	  classified	  by	  three	  independent	  coders,	  paid	  students,	  according	  to	  the	  provided	  categories.	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Table	  B.5:	  Placebo	  regressions,	  leaders'	  communication	  and	  workers'	  behavior	  
Dependent	  variable	   Stage	  2	  performance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  Total	  no.	  of	  characters	  sent	  by	  leader	  during	  period	   -­‐0.001	   	   	   	   	   	  (0.001)	   	   	   	   	   	  Total	  no.	  of	  messages	  sent	  by	  leader	  during	  period	   	   -­‐0.005	   	   	   	   	  	   (0.040)	   	   	   	   	  Humor	  	  	  	  	   	   	   0.673**	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   (0.286)	   	   	   	  Apology	  	  	   	   	   	   -­‐0.191	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   (0.422)	   	   	  Encouragement	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.029	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.189)	   	  Miscellaneous	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   0.234	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.371)	  Previous	  period	  performance	   0.188**	   0.189**	   0.182**	   0.189**	   0.189**	   0.188**	  (0.092)	   (0.092)	   (0.091)	   (0.092)	   (0.092)	   (0.092)	  Previous	  period	  prize	  as	  share	  of	  max	  prize	   -­‐2.598***	   -­‐2.604***	   -­‐2.438***	   -­‐2.592***	   -­‐2.582***	   -­‐2.610***	  (0.788)	   (0.792)	   (0.789)	   (0.788)	   (0.793)	   (0.789)	  Previous	  period	  group	  share	  of	  prize	   2.734	   2.629	   2.408	   2.586	   2.687	   2.681	  (2.982)	   (2.971)	   (2.969)	   (2.972)	   (2.994)	   (2.972)	  Constant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6.315***	   2.264***	   6.153***	   6.280***	   6.255***	   6.258***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.783)	   (0.086)	   (0.774)	   (0.775)	   (0.778)	   (0.775)	  Number	  of	  Obs	   1080	   1080	   1080	   1080	   1080	   1080	  Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐1561.96	   -­‐1562.04	   -­‐1559.23	   -­‐1561.95	   -­‐1562.04	   -­‐1561.85	  Note:	  Random	  effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	  	  
	  
	  
Table	  B.6:	  Leaders'	  rewarding	  strategy	  and	  performance	  in	  the	  Leader	  condition	  
Dependent	  variable	   Stage	  2	  performance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  Correlation	  between	  reward	  and	  performance	  up	  to	  previous	  period	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.035**	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.778*	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.767*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.500)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.430)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.444)	  	  	  	  Previous	  period	  performance	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.406*	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.081	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.243)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.273)	  	  	  	  Previous	  period	  reward	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.019	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.024	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.029)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.029)	  	  	  	  Previous	  period	  Performance*Reward	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.005	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.006	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.007)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.007)	  	  	  	  Previous	  period	  prize	  as	  share	  of	  max	  prize	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐1.940*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (1.134)	  	  	  	  Previous	  period	  group	  share	  of	  prize	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.453**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (4.076)	  	  	  	  Constant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.934***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.852***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.783***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (0.236)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (1.106)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  (1.540)	  	  	  	  Number	  of	  Obs	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  540	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  540	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  540	  	  	  	  Log	  Likelihood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  -­‐773.79	  	  	   	  	  	  	  -­‐757.36	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  -­‐754.16	  	  	  Note:	  Random	  effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	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Table	  B.7:	  Leaders'	  communication	  strategy	  and	  performance	  in	  Leader	  condition	  
Dependent	  
variable	  
Stage	  2	  performance	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  Request	  high	   1.142***	   	   	   	   0.732**	   0.754***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.252)	   	   	   	   (0.285)	   (0.285)	  Request	  low	   -­‐1.991***	   	   	   	   -­‐1.845***	   -­‐1.812***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (0.344)	   	   	   	   (0.355)	   (0.354)	  Praise	  high	   	   -­‐0.090	   	   	   -­‐0.273	   -­‐0.335	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   (0.324)	   	   	   (0.300)	   (0.302)	  Praise	  low	   	   -­‐0.586	   	   	   -­‐0.257	   -­‐0.197	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   (0.522)	   	   	   (0.475)	   (0.475)	  Reward	  high	   	   	   0.926***	   	   0.425	   0.343	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   (0.352)	   	   (0.337)	   (0.339)	  Reward	  low	   	   	   -­‐2.975***	   	   -­‐1.731***	   -­‐1.672**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   (0.664)	   	   (0.669)	   (0.668)	  Dishonest	   	   	   	   0.758***	   0.338	   0.300	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   (0.270)	   (0.284)	   (0.285)	  Honest	  	  	  	   	   	   	   -­‐1.118***	   -­‐1.251***	   -­‐1.280***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   (0.391)	   (0.371)	   (0.371)	  Correlation	  between	  reward	  and	  performance	  up	  to	  previous	  period	  
	   	   	   	   	   0.641	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.397)	  Previous	  period	  performance	   0.283**	   0.312**	   0.260*	   0.333**	   0.289**	   0.286**	  (0.135)	   (0.149)	   (0.141)	   (0.148)	   (0.134)	   (0.134)	  Previous	  period	  prize	  as	  share	  of	  max	  prize	   -­‐0.458	   -­‐1.464	   -­‐1.508	   -­‐1.093	   0.197	   0.077	  (1.058)	   (1.143)	   (1.093)	   (1.135)	   (1.070)	   (1.073)	  Previous	  period	  group	  share	  of	  prize	   8.152**	   9.487**	   9.690**	   9.474**	   9.467**	   9.316**	  (3.849)	   (4.112)	   (3.992)	   (4.036)	   (3.840)	   (3.825)	  Constant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.921***	   3.723***	   3.828***	   3.167***	   2.445**	   2.514**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (1.021)	   (1.137)	   (1.097)	   (1.124)	   (1.020)	   (1.020)	  Number	  of	  Obs	  	  	  	   540	   540	   540	   540	   540	   540	  Log-­‐likelihood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐728.23	   -­‐756.17	   -­‐745.21	   -­‐749.34	   -­‐718.78	   -­‐717.45	  Note:	  Random	  effects	  tobit	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	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C Mathematical	  Appendix	  	  
First	  stage	  (individual	  task)	  In	  contrast	  to	  Section	  3,	  we	  denote	  the	  player’s	  reported	  performance	  level	  with	  𝑝! 	  and	  the	  true	  outcome	  of	  the	  die	  roll	  with	  𝑝! .	  Then,	  a	  player’s	  profit	  is	  given	  by:	  𝜋!(𝑝! ,𝑝!!) = 𝑠!(𝑝! ,𝑝!!)𝑉(𝑝! ,𝑝!!)	  with	  𝑠!(𝑝! ,𝑝!!) = !!!!! !!!!!!!!,!!! 	  ,	  
and	  𝑉(𝑝! ,𝑝!!) = 𝑎,                                                                                      if     !!!!!!! ≤ 𝜇  ,𝑎 − 𝑏 !!! !!!!!!!!,!!!! − 𝜇 ,  if     !!!!!!! > 𝜇  .	  The	  incentive	  for	  each	  player	  i	  to	  report	  a	  higher	  performance	  level	  than	  the	  one	  drawn	  from	  the	  random	  distribution	  is	  denoted	  by	  Δ = 𝜋!(𝑝! + 1)− 𝜋!(𝑝!)	  and	  depends	  on	   the	   other	   players'	   reported	   performance	   levels.	   Therefore	   we	   have	   to	   distinguish	  between	  the	  following	  cases:	  (i)	  Assume	  all	  other	  players'	  reported	  performance	  levels	  are	   such	   that	   !!!!!!! ≤ 𝜇	   holds,	   then	   reporting	   a	   higher	   performance	   can	   either	   (a)	  increase	   the	   reported	   average	   performance	   such	   that	   it	   is	   higher	   than	   the	   expected	  performance	   level	  𝜇	  or	   (b)	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  remains	   lower	   than	   the	  expected	   performance.	   (ii)	   Assume	   all	   players'	   reported	   performance	   levels	   are	   such	  that	   !!!!!!! > 𝜇	  holds,	  independent	  of	  𝑝! .	  We	  can	  show	  that	  for	  the	  parameter	  choice	  of	  a=1250,	  b=300,	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  𝑝! ∈ {1,… , 6},	   and	   for	  N=20	  players,	   the	   incentive	   to	  deviate	   is	  positive	   in	  all	   cases.	  Hence,	  we	   have	   no	   inner	   equilibrium	   and	   all	   players	  will	   report	   the	   highest	   possible	  performance	  level	  of	  𝑝! = 6.	  
Second	  stage	  (group	  task)	  Each	  of	  the	  firms	  𝑓 ∈ {1,… ,𝐹},	  consists	  of	  n	  players	  𝑖 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛},	  with	  𝑛 − 1	  of	  them	  being	  workers	  and	  one	  being	  the	  leader.	  As	  in	  stage	  1,	  each	  worker	  randomly	  draws	  a	  performance	  level,	  which	  is	  private	  information	  to	  each	  worker.	  The	  leaders	  are	  inactive	  players.	   Each	   worker	   is	   then	   asked	   to	   report	   her	   performance	   level	   𝑝! .	   The	   firm’s	  performance	  corresponds	   to	   the	  average	  performance	   reported	  by	   the	   three	  workers,	  𝑝! =    !!!!!!!!!!! .	   Each	   player's	   payoff	   is	   a	   share	   𝑥!,!	   of	   the	   firm's	   payoff	   with	  𝑥!,! ∈ [0.1,… , (1− !!)− 𝑛 − 2 0.1],	   since	  a	  worker	   can	   receive	  any	   share	  between	  0.1	  and	  ((1− !!)− 𝑛 − 2 0.1)	  of	  the	  firm’s	  payoff	  in	  the	  conditions,	  in	  which	  leaders	  have	  the	  power	  to	  give	   financial	   incentives.	  They	  can	   freely	  distribute	  a	  share	  of	  ((1− !!)−
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𝑛 − 1 0.1)	  of	  the	  firm’s	  payoff	  among	  the	  workers.	  The	  leader	  receives	  in	  all	  conditions	  a	  share	  of	  !!-­‐	  of	  the	  firm’s	  payoff	  and	  in	  the	  Inactive	  Leader	  and	  the	  Leader	  Statements	  Only	  condition	  each	  worker	  receives	  !!-­‐th	  as	  well.	  A	  worker’s	  payoff	  is	  therefore:	  𝜋!(𝑝! ,𝑝!!) = 𝑥!,!  𝑠! 𝑝! ,𝑝!! 𝑉(𝑝! ,𝑝!!)	  with	  𝑠!(𝑝! ,𝑝!!) = !!!!! !!!!!!!!,!!! 	  ,	  
and	  𝑉(𝑝! ,𝑝!!) = 𝑎,                                                                                              if     !!!!!!! ≤ 𝜇  ,𝑎 − 𝑏 !!! !!!!!!!!,!!!! − 𝜇 ,  if     !!!!!!! > 𝜇  .	  The	  incentive	  for	  each	  player	  i	  to	  report	  a	  higher	  performance	  level	  than	  the	  one	  drawn	   from	   the	   random	   distribution	   depends	   on	   the	   other	   players'	   reported	  performance	   levels.	   The	   incentive	   is	   denoted	   by	  Δ = 𝜋!(𝑝! + !!!!)− 𝜋!(𝑝!).	   Note	   that	  reporting	   a	   one	   unit	   higher	   performance	   level	   results	   in	   an	   increase	   of	   !!!!	   of	   the	  average	   reported	   performance	   level	   of	   this	   player's	   group.	   Therefore,	   we	   have	   to	  distinguish	   between	   the	   following	   cases:	   (i)	   Assume	   all	   firms'	   reported	   performance	  levels	  are	  such	  that	   !!!!!!! ≤ 𝜇	  holds,	  then	  reporting	  a	  higher	  performance	  can	  either	  (a)	  increase	   the	   reported	   average	   performance	   that	   it	   is	   higher	   than	   the	   expected	  performance	   level	  𝜇	  or	   (b)	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  remains	   lower	   than	   the	  expected	  performance.	  (ii)	  Assume	  all	  other	  firms’	  average	  reported	  performance	  levels	  are	  such	  that	   !!!!!!! > 𝜇	  holds	  independent	  of	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  of	  this	  group	  𝑝! .	  We	  can	  show	  that	  for	  our	  parameter	  choice	  of	  a=1250,	  b=300,	  for	  the	  boundaries	  of	   the	   distribution	   of	   𝑝! ∈ {1,… , 6},	   for	   F=5	   groups,	   and	   n=4	   players	   per	   group,	   the	  incentive	  to	  deviate	  is	  positive	  in	  all	  cases.	  Hence,	  we	  have	  no	  inner	  equilibrium	  and	  all	  players	  will	  report	  the	  highest	  possible	  performance	  level	  of	  𝑝!! = 6.	  	   	  
	   44	  
D Instructions	  Thank	  you	  for	  participating	  in	  today’s	  experiment.	  	  I	  will	  read	  through	  a	  script	  to	  explain	  to	  you	  the	  nature	  of	  today’s	  experiment	  as	  well	  as	  how	  to	  navigate	  the	  computer	  interface	  with	  which	  you	  will	  be	  working.	  I	  will	  use	  this	  script	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  information	  given	  in	  all	  sessions	  of	  this	  experiment	  is	  the	  same.	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  GBP	  2.50	  payment	  that	  you	  receive	   for	  your	  participation,	  you	  will	  be	  paid	  money	  that	  you	  accumulate	  from	  the	  decision	  tasks	  that	  will	  be	  described	  to	  you	  in	  a	  moment.	  The	  exact	  amount	  you	  receive	  will	  be	  determined	  during	  the	  experiment	  and	  will	  depend	  on	  your	  decisions	  and	  the	  decisions	  of	  others.	  You	  will	  be	  paid	  privately,	  in	  cash,	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  All	  monetary	  amounts	  you	  will	  see	  in	  this	  experiment	  will	  be	  denominated	  in	  ECUs	  or	  Experimental	  Currency	  Units.	  We	  will	  convert	  ECUs	  into	  GBP	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  	  
35	  ECUs	  =	  1	  GBP.	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  during	  the	  experiment,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  and	  wait	   for	  an	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  
Please	   do	   not	   talk,	   exclaim,	   or	   try	   to	   communicate	   with	   other	   participants	   during	   the	  
experiment.	  
Do	   not	   use	   the	   computer	   in	   a	   way	   not	   specified	   by	   these	   instructions	   or	   by	   the	  
experimenters.	  Participants	  intentionally	  violating	  the	  rules	  may	  be	  asked	  to	  leave	  the	  experiment	  with	  only	  their	  participation	  payment.	  	  All	  numerical	  examples	  in	  these	  instructions	  are	  used	  simply	  to	  provide	  examples	  and	  do	   not	   represent	   any	   hints	   or	   suggestions	   for	   how	   you	   should	   make	   your	   decisions	  during	  the	  experiment.	  
The	  experiment	  The	  experiment	  consists	  of	  two	  stages.	  There	  are	  20	  participants	  in	  today’s	  experiment.	  You	  and	  all	  other	  19	  participants	  will	  take	  part	   in	  a	  decision	  task	  in	  each	  of	  these	  two	  stages	  What	  happens	  in	  each	  stage	  will	  not	  affect	  the	  procedures	  or	  your	  earnings	  in	  the	  other	   stage.	   You	  will	   receive	   separate	   instructions	   for	   each	   stage,	   once	  we	   reach	   that	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  
INSTRUCTIONS	  ON	  STAGE	  1	  	  In	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  all	  participants	  will	  participate	  together	  in	  a	  single	  decision	  task.	  This	  task	  will	  only	  be	  performed	  once.	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The	  task	  In	  the	  task,	  each	  participant	  in	  the	  experiment	  will	  roll	  a	  die	  privately	  and	  individually	  to	   determine	   his	   or	   her	   “individual	   performance.”	   A	   participant’s	   performance	  represents	   how	   well	   the	   participant	   performed	   the	   task.	   In	   this	   task,	   higher	   scores	  represent	  better	  performance.	  	  A	   6-­‐sided	   die	   and	   a	   cup	   were	   provided	   to	   each	   participant	   before	   the	   start	   of	   the	  experiment.	   Each	   of	   you	   will	   roll	   the	   die	   inside	   the	   cup	   privately	   to	   determine	   your	  individual	   performance.	   You	   should	   roll	   the	   die	   in	   a	   way	   that	   no	   other	   participant	  observes	  the	  outcome	  of	  your	  die	  roll.	  The	  experimenter	  will	  now	  demonstrate	  how	  you	  can	  roll	  the	  die	  so	  that	  only	  you	  can	  observe	  the	  outcome.	  Afterward,	  please	  try	  rolling	  the	  die	   several	   times,	   to	  practice	   this	  procedure	  and	   to	  verify	   that	  you	  received	  a	   fair	  die.	  After	  rolling	  the	  die,	  each	  participant	  will	  report	  his	  or	  her	   individual	  performance	  on	  the	   computer	   screen.	  Note	   that	   there	   is	   no	  way	   for	   anyone,	   neither	   the	   experimenter	  nor	   other	   participants,	   to	   verify	   the	   actual	   individual	   performance	   (die	   roll)	   of	   any	  participant.	  Therefore,	  all	  payoffs	  will	  be	  based	  on	  the	   level	  of	   individual	  performance	  that	   is	  reported	  by	  each	  participant.	  Your	  payoff	   in	  the	  task	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  performance	  you	  report	  and	  by	  the	  performance	  reported	  by	  others.	  
Payoffs	  Each	  participant’s	  payoff	   for	  the	  task	  then	  depends	  on	  the	  performance	  level	  reported	  by	  that	  participant	  and	  on	  the	  performance	  level	  reported	  by	  all	  other	  participants.	   In	  particular,	  the	  reported	  individual	  performance	  levels	  of	  all	  participants	  determine	  the	  
size	  of	  the	  total	  prize	  available	  for	  performing	  the	  task	  and	  each	  participant’s	  reported	  individual	   performance	   level	   determines	   that	  participant’s	   share	   of	   the	   prize.	   This	  share,	  multiplied	  by	  the	  size	  of	  the	  total	  prize,	   is	  then	  that	  participant’s	  payoff	   for	  the	  task.	  	  Specifically,	  each	  participant’s	  payoff	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  1. Size	   of	   the	   prize:	   The	   size	   of	   the	   total	   prize	   depends	   on	   the	   average	   reported	  individual	  performance	   level	  of	  all	  participants,	   including	  you.	  The	  prize	   is	   largest,	  equal	  to	  1250	  ECU,	  when	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  is	  not	  higher	  than	  the	  expected	  average	  performance	   level	   from	  rolling	  a	  die,	  or	  3.5.	   If	  everyone	  rolls	  their	  die	  and	  reports	  the	  observed	  performance	  level,	  one	  would	  expect	  an	  average	  score	  of	  3.5	   (this	   is	   the	  average	  of	   the	  numbers,	  1,	  2,	  3,	  4,	  5	  and	  6).	   If	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  is	  3.5	  or	  lower,	  the	  total	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  will	  be	  fixed	  at	  1250	  ECU.	  But	  a	  higher	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  will	  lower	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize.	  	  The	  table	  below	  shows	  how	  the	  prize	  varies	  with	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level.	   The	   average	   reported	   performance	   level	   is	   calculated	   by	   adding	   the	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performance	   levels	   reported	  by	   all	   participants	   and	   then	  dividing	   this	   sum	  by	   the	  number	  of	  participants,	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  20	  	  
Average	  reported	  performance	  
level	  of	  all	  participants	   Size	  of	  the	  prize	   Prize	  in	  ECU	  1	   100%	   1250	  1.5	   100%	   1250	  2	   100%	   1250	  2.5	   100%	   1250	  3	   100%	   1250	  3.5	  (expected)	   100%	   1250	  4	   88%	   1100	  4.5	   76%	   950	  5	   64%	   800	  5.5	   52%	   650	  6	   40%	   500	  	  The	  exact	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  following	  formula:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  That	  is,	  for	  every	  unit	  by	  which	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  is	  above	  3.5,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  decreases	  by	  24	  percent.	  2. Your	  share	  of	  the	  prize:	  Each	  participant’s	  share	  of	  the	  total	  prize	  is	  determined	  by	  the	   ratio	  of	   that	  participant’s	   reported	  performance	   level	  and	   the	  sum	  of	   reported	  performance	  levels	  of	  all	  participants.	  	   Share  of  the  prize = Own  reported  performance  levelSum  of  reported  performance  levels  of  all  participants	  
If	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  is	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  3.5	  (expected	  average	  performance	  level):	  	  
Prize	  =	  1250	  If	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  is	  greater	  than	  3.5	  (expected	  average	  performance	  level):	  
Prize	  =	  1250	  –	  300	  x	  (average	  reported	  performance	  level	  –	  3.5)	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Thus,	   for	   any	   total	   size	   of	   the	   prize,	   your	   share	   of	   the	   prize	   is	   greater	  when	   your	  reported	  performance	  level	  is	  greater.	  	  3. Your	  payoff:	   Each	   participant’s	   payoff	   is	   calculated	   by	  multiplying	   the	   size	   of	   the	  prize	  by	  that	  participant’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize.	  	   Your  payoff = (Size  of  the  prize)  ×  (Your  share  of  the  prize)	  Are	  there	  any	  questions	  about	  how	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize,	  shares	  of	  the	  prize,	  or	  payoffs	  will	  be	  determined	  in	  stage	  1?	  Remember	  that	  if	  you	  have	  a	  question	  at	  any	  point	  during	  the	  experiment,	  you	  should	  raise	  your	  hand	  and	  wait	   for	  the	  experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  
Feedback	  At	  the	  end	  of	  Stage	  1,	  you	  will	  see	  a	  screen	  that	  shows	  you:	  
• Your	  reported	  performance	  level	  
• The	  average	  reported	  performance	  among	  all	  participants	  
• The	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  
• Your	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  
• Your	  payoff	  	  
Examples	  We	  will	  now	  go	  through	  some	  examples	  to	  make	  sure	  that	   it	   is	  clear	  to	  everyone	  how	  payoffs	  are	  determined.	  Example	  1:	  Suppose	   that	   your	   reported	   performance	   level	   is	   5,	   the	   sum	   of	   all	   participants’	  performance	  levels,	  including	  yours,	  is	  100,	  and	  the	  average	  performance	  level	  of	  all	  20	  participants	  is	  5.	  	  In	  this	  case:	  
• The	  total	  prize	  is	  800	  ECU	  (i.e.,	  1250	  ECU	  –	  300	  ECU	  (5	  –	  3.5)	  =	  800	  ECU).	  The	  prize	   is	   smaller	   than	   1250	   ECU	   because	   the	   average	   performance	   level	   of	   all	  participants	  (5)	  is	  greater	  than	  3.5	  
• Your	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  is	  5/100	  =	  0.05.	  	  
• Your	  payoff	  for	  this	  task	  is	  then	  800	  ECU	  x	  0.05	  =	  40	  ECU.	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Example	  2:	  Now	   suppose	   that	   your	   reported	   performance	   level	   is	  3,	   the	   sum	   of	   all	   participants’	  performance	   levels,	   including	   yours,	   is	   70,	   and	   the	   average	   performance	   level	   of	   all	  participants	  is	  3.5.	  	  In	  this	  case:	  
• The	   total	   prize	   is	   1250	   ECU	   because	   the	   average	   performance	   level	   of	   all	  participants	  (3.5)	  is	  equal	  to	  3.5.	  
• Your	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  is	  3/70≅0.043.	  	  
• Your	  payoff	  for	  this	  task	  is	  then	  1250	  ECU	  x	  0.043	  ≅	  53.8	  ECU.	  
	  Note	   that	   in	   this	   and	   following	  examples	  we	   round	  numbers	   to	  one	  decimal	  place	   for	  calculations.	  However,	  the	  computer	  will	  calculate	  numbers	  exactly.	  	  
Practice	  questions	  Before	  we	  begin	  with	  Stage	  1,	   in	  which	  you	  will	  perform	  the	  above	   task	  one	   time,	  we	  will	  first	  ask	  you	  to	  answer	  some	  practice	  questions	  about	  payoffs.	  This	  is	  done	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  everyone	  understands	  how	  payoffs	  are	  calculated.	  Please	  click	  “OK”	  on	  your	  screen	  now,	  to	  see	  the	  practice	  questions,	  and	  try	  to	  answer	  them.	   If	  you	  have	  a	  question	  or	  are	  confused,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  and	  wait	   for	   the	  experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  As	  soon	  as	  everyone	  has	  answered	  the	  practice	  questions	  correctly,	  Stage	  1	  will	  start.	  
{PRACTICE	  QUESTION	  STAGE	  1,	  on	  screen}	  Please	  answer	  the	  questions	  below.	  	  If	   you	   need	   help,	   the	   instructions	   contain	   detailed	   explanations	   of	   how	   to	   determine	  each	  answer.	  For	  example,	  to	  determine	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  in	  the	  first	  question,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  section	  of	  the	  instructions	  titled	  “Size	  of	  the	  Prize.”	  	  If	  you	  have	  a	  question,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand.	  	  Suppose	  a	  participant	   reports	  her	  performance	   level	   to	  be	  4,	   the	   sum	  of	   the	   reported	  performance	  levels	  of	  all	  20	  participants	  is	  80,	  and	  the	  average	  performance	  level	  of	  all	  participants	  is	  4.	  What	  is	  the	  prize	  in	  ECU?	  What	  is	  that	  participant’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize?	  What	  is	  that	  participant’s	  payoff	  in	  stage	  1?	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INSTRUCTIONS	  ON	  STAGE	  2	  	  The	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  consists	  of	  10	  periods.	  	  
Groups	  and	  roles	  At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   stage	   you	   will	   be	   randomly	   matched	   with	   three	   other	  participants.	   You	   and	   these	   participants	   will	   form	   a	   group	   consisting	   of	   four	  participants.	   The	   computer	   will	   randomly	   decide	   who	   is	   matched	   together,	   using	  randomly	  assigned	  ID	  numbers.	  The	  matching	  process	   is	  not	  affected	  by	  anything	  that	  happened	   in	   stage	   1.	   At	   no	   time	   will	   your	   true	   identity	   be	   revealed	   to	   the	   other	  participants	  with	  whom	  you	  are	  matched,	  nor	  will	  you	  ever	  know	  the	  identity	  of	  these	  participants.	  You	  remain	  matched	  with	  the	  same	  three	  participants	  for	  all	  10	  periods	  of	  stage	  2.	  	  All	  groups	  will	  participate	  in	  a	  decision	  task	  in	  every	  period	  of	  stage	  2.	  The	  four	  participants	  in	  each	  group	  will	  be	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  roles	  by	  the	  computer.	  The	  computer	  will	  randomly	  select	  one	  member	  of	  each	  group	  to	  be	  the	  supervisor	  of	  the	   group.	   The	   remaining	   three	   participants	   will	   perform	   the	   task	   for	   the	   group,	   as	  
workers.	  	  We	   will	   now	   describe	   how	   the	   workers	   perform	   the	   task,	   how	   the	   prize	   and	   each	  group’s	   share	   of	   the	   prize	   are	   determined,	   the	   function	   of	   the	   supervisor,	   and	   how	  supervisor	  and	  worker	  payoffs	  are	  determined	  in	  stage	  2.	  
The	  task	  for	  workers	  The	  task	  will	  be	  different	  for	  the	  supervisors	  and	  for	  the	  workers.	  We	  will	  first	  describe	  the	  task	  for	  workers	  and	  will	  later	  describe	  the	  role	  of	  supervisors.	  Like	   in	  stage	  1,	  each	  participant	   in	  the	  role	  of	  a	  worker	  will	  privately	  and	  individually	  roll	  a	  6-­‐sided	  die	  inside	  a	  cup	  to	  determine	  his	  or	  her	  individual	  performance	  level.	  After	  rolling	  the	  die	  each	  worker	  will	  then	  report	  his	  or	  her	  individual	  performance	  level	  on	  the	  computer	  screen.	  	  	  Then,	   the	   computer	  will	   add	  up	  all	   reported	  performance	   levels	  within	  each	  group	   to	  determine	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	   for	  each	  group.	  The	  average	  reported	  performance	   level	   of	   a	   group	   represents	   how	  well	   the	   workers	   in	   that	   group	   report	  having	  collectively	  performed	  the	  task.	  	  
A	  group’s	  payoff	  The	  group’s	  payoff	   in	  a	  period	  depends	  on	   the	  group’s	   reported	  average	  performance	  level	  and	  on	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  levels	  of	  all	  of	  the	  other	  groups.	  
	   50	  
In	  particular,	  the	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  across	  all	  groups	  determines	  the	  
size	   of	   the	   total	   prize	   available	   for	   performing	   the	   task.	   Each	   group’s	   performance	  level	   determines	   that	  group’s	   share	   of	   the	   prize.	   This	   share,	  multiplied	   by	   the	   total	  prize,	   is	   that	   group’s	   payoff.	   This	   group	   payoff	   is	   then	   divided	   between	   all	   four	  members	  of	  that	  group,	  the	  supervisor	  and	  the	  three	  workers.	  	  Specifically,	  each	  group’s	  total	  payoff	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  1. Size	  of	  the	  prize:	  The	  size	  of	  the	  total	  prize	  depends	  on	  the	  average	  of	  the	  reported	  group	   performance	   levels	   of	   all	   of	   the	   groups,	   including	   your	   group.	   The	   prize	   is	  largest,	  equal	  to	  1250	  ECU,	  when	  the	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  level	  of	  all	  groups	  is	  not	  higher	  than	  the	  expected	  average	  performance	  level	  from	  rolling	  a	  die,	   or	   3.5.	   If	   all	   workers	   in	   a	   group	   roll	   their	   die	   and	   report	   the	   observed	  performance	  level,	  one	  would	  expect	  an	  average	  group	  performance	  score	  of	  3.5.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  for	  all	  groups,	  then	  one	  would	  also	  expect	  an	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	   level	   of	   3.5	   across	   all	   groups.	   If	   the	   average	   reported	   group	  performance	  level	  is	  3.5	  or	  lower,	  the	  total	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  will	  be	  fixed	  at	  1250	  ECU.	  But	   a	   higher	   average	   reported	   group	   performance	   level	  will	   lower	   the	   size	   of	   the	  prize.	  	  	  The	   table	   below	   shows	   how	   the	   prize	   varies	   with	   the	   average	   reported	   group	  performance	   level	   of	   all	   groups.	   This	   table	   is	   the	   same	   as	   in	   stage	   1.	   The	   average	  reported	   group	   performance	   level	   of	   all	   groups	   is	   calculated	   by	   adding	   up	   the	  average	  reported	  performance	  levels	  reported	  by	  all	  groups,	  and	  then	  dividing	  it	  by	  the	  number	  of	  groups,	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  5.	  	  
Average	  reported	  group	  
performance	  level	  of	  all	  groups	  
Size	  of	  the	  prize	   Prize	  in	  ECU	  1	   100%	   1250	  1.5	   100%	   1250	  2	   100%	   1250	  2.5	   100%	   1250	  3	   100%	   1250	  3.5	  (expected)	   100%	   1250	  4	   88%	   1100	  4.5	   76%	   950	  5	   64%	   800	  5.5	   52%	   650	  6	   40%	   500	  	   The	  exact	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  following	  formula:	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   That	   is,	   for	   every	   unit	   by	  which	   the	   average	   reported	   group	  performance	   level	   is	  above	  3.5,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  decreases	  by	  24	  percent.	  	  2. Your	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize:	  Each	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  total	  prize	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  ratio	  of	  that	  group’s	  average	  reported	  performance	  level	  and	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  levels	  of	  all	  groups.	  	   Group′s  share  of  the  prize= Group′s  average  reported  performance  levelSum  of  average  reported  group  performance  levels  of  all  groups	  Thus,	  for	  any	  total	  size	  of	  the	  prize,	  your	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  is	  greater	  when	  your	  group’s	  reported	  average	  performance	  level	  is	  greater.	  	  3. Your	  group’s	  payoff:	  Each	  group’s	  total	  payoff	  is	  calculated	  by	  multiplying	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  by	  that	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize.	  	   Your  group!s  payoff = (Size  of  the  prize)  𝑥  (Your  group!s  share  of  the  prize)	  Notice	  that	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  and	  each	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  are	  calculated	  in	  essentially	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  stage	  1.	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  supervisor	  One	  person	   in	  each	  group	   is	   in	   the	  role	  of	  supervisor.	  The	  same	  person	   in	  each	  group	  will	  be	  supervisor	  in	  all	  10	  periods	  of	  stage	  2.	  The	  group	  supervisor	  does	  not	  perform	  the	  task,	  but	  receives	  the	  same	  information	  as	  the	  group	  workers.	   In	  particular,	   the	  supervisor	  also	  observes	   the	  reported	   individual	  performance	   level	   of	   each	   worker	   in	   the	   group	   and	   the	   average	   reported	   group	  performance	  levels	  of	  all	  groups.	  
If	  the	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  level	  is	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  3.5	  (expected	  average	  performance	  level):	  	  
Prize	  =	  1250	  If	  the	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  level	  is	  greater	  than	  3.5	  (expected	  average	  group	  performance	  level):	  
Prize	  =	  1250	  –	  300	  x	  (average	  reported	  group	  performance	  	  
level	  of	  all	  groups	  –	  3.5)	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{LEADER	   INCENTIVES	   ONLY	   &	   LEADER	   CONDITIONS:	   The	   supervisor	   will	   also	  determine	   how	   part	   of	   the	   group’s	   payoff	   is	   divided	   among	   the	  workers.	   Specifically,	  after	  finding	  out	  the	  group’s	  payoff	  for	  a	  period,	  the	  supervisor	  will	  divide	  45%	  of	  this	  total	  group	  payoff	   among	   the	  workers,	   as	  a	   “bonus.”	  That	   is,	  45%	  of	   the	   total	  group	  
payoff	  in	  a	  round	  is	  set	  aside	  as	  a	  bonus	  for	  the	  supervisor	  to	  distribute	  among	  the	  
workers.	   Bonus = 0.45  𝑥  Group!s  payoff	  The	  supervisor	  must	  distribute	  this	  entire	  bonus	  amount	  among	  the	  three	  workers.	  	  To	  divide	  the	  bonus	  among	  the	  workers,	  the	  supervisor	  will	  enter	  a	  share	  of	  the	  bonus,	  as	  a	  percentage,	  that	  is	  to	  be	  received	  by	  each	  worker.	  For	  instance,	  	  
• The	  supervisor	  can	  give	  the	  entire	  bonus	  to	  one	  worker,	  by	  specifying	  that	  this	  worker	  receive	  100	  percent	  of	  the	  bonus	  and	  the	  other	  two	  workers	  each	  receive	  0	  percent.	  	  
• Alternatively,	   the	   supervisor	   can	  distribute	   the	  bonus	   equally	   among	   the	   three	  workers,	  by	  specifying	  that	  each	  worker	  receive	  33.3	  percent	  of	  the	  bonus.	  	  
• Or,	  the	  supervisor	  can	  distribute	  the	  bonus	  equally	  among	  only	  two	  workers,	  by	  specifying	   that	  each	  of	   these	   two	  workers	   receive	  50	  percent	  of	   the	  bonus	  and	  the	  other	  worker	  receives	  0	  percent.	  	  
• The	   supervisor	   can	   distribute	   the	   bonus	   in	   any	   other	   way	   among	   the	   three	  workers,	  by	  specifying	  three	  numbers	  that	  add	  up	  to	  100	  percent.	  	  The	   supervisor	   cannot	   give	   any	   of	   the	   bonus	   to	   him	  or	   herself.	   The	   supervisor’s	   own	  payoff	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  how	  he	  or	  she	  distributes	  the	  bonus	  among	  the	  three	  workers.}	  	  {LEADER	   STATEMENTS	   ONLY	   CONDITION:	   At	   the	   beginning	   of	   each	   period,	   before	  workers	  roll	   their	  die	  and	  report	  their	  performance,	   the	  supervisor	   in	  each	  group	  will	  communicate	   with	   the	   workers	   in	   his	   or	   her	   group.	   The	   supervisor	   will	   have	   90	  
seconds	  to	  send	  messages	  to	  his	  or	  her	  group	  workers.	  Messages	  will	  be	  sent	  via	  a	  chat	   box	   on	   the	   computer	   screen.	   The	   group	  workers	   cannot	   send	  messages	   to	   each	  other	  or	  to	  the	  supervisor.	  When	  sending	  messages,	  please	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  information	  that	  could	  reveal	  your	  identity	   or	   try	   to	   elicit	   the	   identity	   of	   others	   and	   avoid	   using	   any	   offensive	   language	  in	  your	  messages.}	  
Supervisor	  and	  worker	  payoffs	  In	   a	   period,	   each	   of	   the	   four	   group	  members	   –	   both	   supervisors	   and	   workers	   –	   will	  receive	   portions	   of	   the	   group’s	   share	   of	   the	   prize.	   Specifically,	   the	   supervisor’s	   and	  workers’	  portions	  are	  determined	  as	  follows:	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1. Supervisor’s	  payoff:	  In	  each	  group,	  the	  supervisor	  receives	  one	  fourth	  (25	  percent)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.	  That	  is,	  	   Supervisor!s  payoff = 0.25  𝑥  Group!s  payoff	  {NO	  LEADER	  &	  LEADER	  STATEMENTS	  ONLY	  CONDITIONS:	  2. Worker’s	  payoffs:	   In	  each	  group,	  each	  of	   the	   three	  workers	  will	  also	  receive	  one-­‐fourth	  (25	  percent)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.	  That	  is,	  	  	   Each  worker!s  payoff = 0.25  𝑥  Group!s  payoff	  The	  total	  amount	  received	  by	  the	  three	  workers	  is	  75%	  (25%	  +	  25%	  +	  25%)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.}	  {LEDAER	  INCENTIVES	  ONLY	  &	  LEADER	  CONDITIONS:	  2. Worker’s	  payoffs:	   In	  each	  group,	  each	  of	  the	  three	  workers	  will	  receive	  one-­‐tenth	  (10	  percent)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff,	  plus	  any	  amount	  that	  is	  allocated	  to	  that	  worker	  by	  the	  supervisor	  as	  part	  of	  the	  bonus.	  	  	                                 Each  worker!s  payoff = 0.10  𝑥  Group!s  payoff	                                                                                        +  bonus  awarded  by  supervisor  	  Recall	  that	  the	  supervisor	  can	  divide	  45%	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff	  among	  the	  workers,	  as	  a	  bonus,	  in	  any	  way	  that	  he	  or	  she	  desires.	  Each	  worker	  will	  therefore	  receive	  the	  guaranteed	   10%	   share	   that	   each	  worker	   receives,	   plus	   a	   bonus	   between	   0%	   and	  45%	   of	   the	   group’s	   payoff.	   A	   worker	   can	   therefore	   receive,	   in	   total,	   any	   amount	  between	  10%	  and	  55%	  percent	  of	   the	  group’s	   total	  payoff,	  depending	  on	  how	  the	  supervisor	  chooses	  to	  divide	  the	  45%	  bonus.	  	  The	  total	  amount	  received	  by	  the	  three	  workers	  is	  75%	  (10%	  +	  10%	  +	  10%	  +	  45%)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.}	  Are	   there	   any	   questions	   about	   how	   the	   size	   of	   the	   prize,	   shares	   of	   the	   prize,	   or	  supervisor’s	  or	  workers’	  payoffs	  will	  be	  determined	   in	  stage	  2?	  Remember	   that	   if	  you	  have	   a	   question	   at	   any	   point	   during	   the	   experiment,	   you	   should	   raise	   your	   hand	   and	  wait	  for	  the	  experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  
Feedback	  After	  each	  period,	  each	  member	  of	  your	  group,	   the	  supervisor	  and	   the	   three	  workers,	  will	  find	  out:	  
• The	  reported	  individual	  performance	  levels	  of	  each	  worker	  in	  your	  group	  
• The	  average	  group	  performance	  level	  of	  your	  group	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• The	  average	  group	  performance	  level	  of	  each	  group	  
• The	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  
• Your	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  
• Your	  group’s	  payoff	  
• The	   payoff	   received	   by	   each	   member	   of	   your	   group,	   including	   you.	   {LEADER	  
INCENTIVES	   ONLY	   &	   LEADER	   CONDITIONS:	   This	   will	   include	   the	   fixed	   10	  percent	   share	   and	   the	   additional	   bonus	   share,	   determined	   by	   the	   supervisor,	  received	  by	  each	  worker	  in	  your	  group.}	  	  At	   the	  end	  of	   the	  experiment,	   you	  will	  be	   informed	  about	  your	   total	   earnings,	   i.e.,	   the	  sum	  of	  your	  payoffs	  for	  stage	  1	  and	  for	  all	  10	  periods	  of	  stage	  2.	  After	  the	  experiment	  your	  total	  earnings	  in	  ECU	  will	  be	  converted	  into	  GBP	  and	  will	  be	  paid	  privately,	  in	  cash,	  together	  with	  your	  participation	  payment.	  	  
Examples	  We	  will	  now	  go	  through	  some	  examples	  to	  make	  sure	  that	   it	   is	  clear	  to	  everyone	  how	  payoffs	  are	  determined.	  Example	  1:	  	  Suppose	  that	  your	  group’s	  reported	  average	  performance	  level	  is	  5,	  the	  sum	  of	  average	  performance	   levels	  of	  all	  groups,	   including	  your	  group’s	  average	  performance	   level,	   is	  
25,	  and	  the	  average	  performance	  level	  of	  all	  groups	  is	  5.	  	  {LEADER	   INCENTIVES	   ONLY	   &	   LEADER	   CONDITIONS:	   Suppose	   that	   the	   group	  supervisor	  decides	  to	  divide	  the	  45%	  bonus	  evenly	  among	  the	  group	  workers.	  That	  is,	  each	  group	  worker	  receives	  15%	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff	  as	  part	  of	  the	  bonus,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  fixed	  10%	  share,	  or	  25%	  in	  total.}	  In	  this	  case:	  
• The	  total	  prize	  is	  800	  ECU	  (i.e.,	  1250	  ECU	  –	  300	  ECU	  (5	  –	  3.5)	  =	  800	  ECU).	  The	  prize	   is	   smaller	   than	   1250	   ECU	   because	   the	   average	   performance	   level	   of	   all	  groups	  (5)	  is	  greater	  than	  3.5	  
• Your	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  is	  5/25	  =	  0.2.	  	  
• Your	  group’s	  payoff	  for	  this	  task	  is	  0.2	  x	  800	  ECU	  =	  160	  ECU.	  
• The	  supervisor’s	  payoff	  is	  0.25	  x	  160	  =	  40	  ECU.	  
• {NO	   LEADER	   &	   LEADER	   STATEMENTS	   ONLY	   CONDITIONS:	   Each	   worker’s	  payoff	  is	  0.25	  x	  160	  =	  40	  ECU.}	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• {LEADER	  INCENTIVES	  ONLY	  &	  LEADER	  CONDITIONS:	  The	  available	  share	  for	  the	  supervisor	  to	  distribute	  among	  workers	  as	  a	  bonus	  is	  0.45	  x	  160	  ECU	  =	  72	  ECU.	  
• Each	  worker’s	  payoff	   is	  0.10	  x	  160	  ECU	  +	  72	  ECU	  /	  3	  =	  16	  ECU	  +	  24	  ECU	  =	  40	  ECU.	  	  Note	   that	   the	   first	   part	   of	   a	  worker’s	   payoff	   is	   the	   fixed	  10	  percent	   that	   each	  worker	  receives	   and	   the	   second	   part	   is	   the	   portion	   that	   is	   allocated	   by	   the	   supervisor	   as	   a	  bonus.}	  Example	  2:	  Now	   suppose	   that	   your	   group’s	   average	   reported	   performance	   level	   is	  3,	   the	   sum	   of	  average	  performance	   levels	  of	  all	  groups,	   including	  your	  group’s	  average	  performance	  level,	   is	   17.5,	   and	   the	   average	   performance	   level	   of	   all	   groups	   is	   3.5.	   {LEADER	  
INCENTIVES	   ONLY	   &	   LEADER	   CONDITIONS:	   Suppose	   that	   the	   group	   supervisor	  decides	  to	  give	  the	  entire	  45%	  bonus	  to	  one	  of	  the	  three	  workers	  and	  to	  give	  none	  of	  the	  bonus	  to	  the	  other	  two	  workers.}	  In	  this	  case:	  
• The	  total	  prize	  is	  1250	  ECU	  because	  the	  average	  performance	  level	  of	  all	  groups	  (3.5)	  is	  equal	  to	  3.5.	  
• Your	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize	  is	  3/17.5≅0.17.	  
• Your	  group’s	  payoff	  is	  0.17	  x	  1250	  ECU	  =	  212.5	  ECU.	  	  
• The	  supervisor’s	  payoff	  is	  0.25	  x	  212.5	  ECU	  ≅	  53.1	  ECU.	  
• {NO	   LEADER	   &	   LEADER	   STATEMENTS	   ONLY	   CONDITIONS:	   Each	   worker’s	  payoff	  is	  0.25	  x	  212.5	  ECU	  ≅	  53.1ECU.}	  
• {LEADER	  INCENTIVES	  ONLY	  &	  LEADER	  CONDITIONS:	  The	  available	  share	  for	  the	  supervisor	  to	  distribute	  among	  workers	  as	  a	  bonus	  is	  0.45	  x	  212.5	  ECU≅	  95.6	  ECU.	  
• One	  worker	  receives	  a	  payoff	  of	  0.10	  x	  212.5	  ECU	  +	  95.6	  ECU	  ≅	  116.9ECU.	  
• The	  other	  two	  workers	  receive	  a	  payoff	  of	  0.10	  x	  212.5	  ECU	  +	  0	  ≅	  21.3	  ECU.	  Note	   that	   the	   first	   part	   of	   a	  worker’s	   payoff	   is	   the	   fixed	  10	  percent	   that	   each	  worker	  receives	   and	   the	   second	   part	   is	   the	   portion	   that	   is	   allocated	   by	   the	   supervisor	   as	   a	  bonus.}	  
Practice	  questions	  Before	  we	  begin	  with	  Stage	  2,	  in	  which	  you	  will	  perform	  the	  above	  task	  in	  groups	  for	  10	  periods,	  we	  will	  first	  ask	  you	  to	  answer	  some	  practice	  questions	  about	  payoffs.	  This	  is	  done	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  everyone	  understands	  how	  payoffs	  are	  calculated.	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Please	  click	  “OK”	  on	  your	  screen	  now,	  to	  see	  the	  practice	  questions,	  and	  try	  to	  answer	  them.	   If	  you	  have	  a	  question	  or	  are	  confused,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  and	  wait	   for	   the	  experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  As	  soon	  as	  everyone	  has	  answered	  the	  practice	  questions	  correctly,	  Stage	  2	  will	  start.	  	  
{PRACTICE	  QUESTION	  STAGE	  2,	  on	  screen}	  Please	  answer	  the	  questions	  below.	  	  If	   you	   need	   help,	   the	   instructions	   contain	   detailed	   explanations	   of	   how	   to	   determine	  each	  answer.	  For	  example,	  to	  determine	  the	  size	  of	  the	  prize	  in	  the	  first	  question,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  section	  of	  the	  instructions	  titled	  “Size	  of	  the	  Prize.”	  	  If	  you	  have	  a	  question,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand.	  1) Suppose	  a	  participant	  in	  the	  role	  of	  a	  worker	  reports	  her	  performance	  level	  to	  be	  4,	  and	  the	  average	  performance	  level	  of	  that	  participant’s	  group	  is	  4.	  The	  sum	  of	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  levels	  of	  all	  5	  groups	  is	  20	  and	  the	  average	  reported	  group	  performance	  level	  of	  all	  groups	  is	  4.	  {LEADER	  INCENTIVES	  ONLY	  &	  LEADER	  CONDITIONS:	  Suppose	  the	  supervisor	  decides	  to	  allocate	  the	  entire	  bonus	  of	  45%	  to	  that	  participant.}	  What	  is	  the	  prize	  in	  ECU?	  What	  is	  the	  group’s	  share	  of	  the	  prize?	  What	  is	  the	  group’s	  payoff	  in	  that	  period?	  What	  is	  the	  group	  supervisor’s	  payoff	  in	  that	  period?	  (Hint	  Button:	  This	  is	  one	  fourth	  (0.25)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.)	  {NO	  LEADER	  &	  LEADER	  STATEMENTS	  ONLY	  CONDITIONS:	  What	  is	  a	  group	  worker’s	  payoff	  in	  that	  period?	  (Hint	  Button:	  This	  is	  one	  fourth	  (0.25)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.)}	  	  {LEADER	  INCENTIVES	  ONLY	  &	  LEADER	  CONDITIONS:	  What	  is	  the	  amount	  that	  can	  be	  allocated	  by	  the	  group	  supervisor	  to	  the	  group	  workers	  in	  that	  period	  as	  a	  bonus?	  (Hint	  Button:	  This	  is	  45	  percent	  (0.45)	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.)	  What	  is	  the	  payoff	  of	  the	  group	  worker	  receiving	  the	  entire	  bonus	  in	  that	  period?	  (Hint	  Button:	  The	  worker	  receives	  10	  percent	  plus	  45	  percent,	  or	  55	  percent	  (0.55),	  of	  the	  group’s	  payoff.)}	  	  2) At	  the	  end	  of	  a	  period	  in	  stage	  2,	  who	  is	  informed	  about	  a	  participant’s	  reported	  performance	  level	  in	  that	  period?	  
☐ all	  participants	  in	  the	  experiment	  
☐ only	  the	  participant’s	  group	  supervisor.	  
! all	  members	  of	  the	  participant’s	  group.	  	  
INSTRUCTIONS	  ON	  STAGE	  3	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Stage	   2	   of	   the	   experiment	   is	   complete.	   Before	   concluding	   the	   experiment,	   you	   will	  complete	   several	   questionnaires	   in	   which	   you	   will	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	   earn	  additional	  ECUs.	  We	  will	  next	  ask	  you	  and	  all	  other	  participants	  to	  evaluate	  different	  possible	  choices	  one	  might	  have	  made	   in	   stages	  1	   and	  2	  of	   the	  experiment.	   Specifically,	  we	  will	   describe	  a	  choice	   that	   a	   participant	   in	   the	   experiment	  might	   have	  made,	   and	   you	   should	   decide	  whether	  making	  that	  choice	  would	  be	  “socially	  appropriate”	  and	  “consistent	  with	  moral	  or	  proper	  social	  behavior”	  or	   “socially	   inappropriate”	  and	  “inconsistent	  with	  moral	  or	  proper	   social	   behavior.”	   By	   socially	   appropriate,	  we	  mean	   behavior	   that	  most	   people	  agree	  is	  the	  “correct”	  or	  “ethical”	  thing	  to	  do.	  Another	  way	  to	  think	  about	  what	  we	  mean	  is	   that,	   if	   someone	   were	   to	   make	   a	   socially	   inappropriate	   choice,	   then	   someone	  observing	  this	  behavior	  might	  get	  angry	  at	  the	  person	  who	  made	  the	  choice	  for	  acting	  in	  that	  manner.	  In	   each	   of	   your	   responses,	   we	   would	   like	   you	   to	   evaluate	   what	   constitutes	   socially	  appropriate	   or	   inappropriate	   behavior.	   To	   give	   you	   an	   idea,	   consider	   the	   following	  example.	  	  
Someone	  is	  at	  a	  local	  cafe.	  While	  there,	  the	  person	  notices	  that	  someone	  has	  left	  a	  wallet	  at	  













☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 	  If	  this	  were	  the	  situation	  we	  asked	  you	  about	  in	  the	  study,	  you	  would	  indicate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  you	  believe	  taking	  the	  wallet	  would	  be	  "socially	  appropriate"	  and	  "consistent	  with	  moral	  or	  proper	  social	  behavior"	  or	  "socially	  inappropriate"	  and	  "inconsistent	  with	  moral	  or	  proper	  social	  behavior".	  Recall	  that	  by	  socially	  appropriate	  we	  mean	  behavior	  that	  most	  people	  agree	  is	  the	  "correct"	  or	  "ethical"	  thing	  to	  do.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  you	  thought	  that	  taking	  the	  wallet	  was	  very	  socially	  inappropriate.	  Then,	  you	  would	  indicate	  your	  response	  by	  selecting	  the	  first	  box.	  	  For	  each	  choice	  you	  make,	  we	  will	  compare	  your	  response	  to	  the	  response	  of	  one	  other	  
participant.	  	  If	  you	  give	  the	  same	  response	  as	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  the	  selected	  other	  participant,	   then	  you	  will	  receive	  an	  additional	  ECU	  17.5	  (GBP	  0.50).	  This	  amount	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  you,	  along	  with	  your	  other	  earnings,	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  experiment.	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	   example	   situation	   above,	   if	   your	   response	   had	   been	   "somewhat	  socially	  inappropriate,"	  then	  you	  would	  receive	  an	  additional	  ECU	  17.5	  (GBP	  0.50)	  if	  this	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was	   also	   the	   response	   provided	   by	   a	   randomly	   selected	   other	   participant	   in	   today’s	  session.	  Otherwise	  you	  would	  not	  receive	  any	  additional	  money	  for	  this	  question.	  Are	   there	   any	   questions	   about	   this	   task?	   Once	   we	   continue,	   you	   will	   see	   detailed	  descriptions	  of	  the	  choices	  you	  are	  to	  evaluate	  and	  instructions	  on	  how	  to	  proceed.	  	  If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   at	   any	   time,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  After	  you	  have	  answered	  all	  questions	  you	  will	  see	  how	  much	  how	  have	  earned.	  Then	  we	  will	  start	  another	  questionnaire.	  For	  answering	  theses	  further	  questions	  we	  will	  pay	  you	  an	  additional	  ECU	  70	  (GBP	  2.00).	  After	  completing	  the	  questionnaire	  you	  will	  be	  informed	  about	  your	  total	  payoff	  and	  receive	  your	  payment.	  
On	  computer	  screen:	  Question	  1:	  For	  the	  following	  question,	  we	  will	  compare	  your	  response	  to	  the	  response	  of	   one	   randomly	   selected	   other	   participant	   in	   the	   session.	   You	   will	   receive	   the	  additional	  payment	   if	  your	  response	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  the	  randomly	  selected	  participant	  in	  the	  session.	  
Suppose	  that,	  in	  Stage	  1,	  someone	  rolled	  a	  1	  on	  his	  or	  her	  die.	  How	  appropriate	  would	  it	  
have	   been	   for	   that	   participant	   to	   report	   a	   higher	   number	   than	   1	   in	   Stage	   1	   of	   the	  
experiment,	   when	   earnings	   were	   based	   on	   individual	   performance	   level	   and	   on	   the	  













☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 	  Question	  2:	  For	  the	  following	  question,	  we	  will	  compare	  your	  response	  to	  the	  response	  of	   one	   randomly	   selected	   other	   participant	   in	   the	   session.	   You	   will	   receive	   the	  additional	  payment	   if	  your	  response	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  the	  randomly	  selected	  participant	  in	  the	  session.	  
Suppose	  that,	  in	  Stage	  2,	  a	  Worker	  rolled	  a	  1	  on	  his	  or	  her	  die.	  How	  appropriate	  would	  it	  
have	  been	  for	  that	  Worker	  to	  report	  a	  higher	  number	  than	  1	  in	  Stage	  2	  of	  the	  experiment,	  
when	  earnings	  were	  based	  on	  the	  group	  performance	  level	  of	  the	  Worker’s	  group	  and	  on	  
the	  performance	  level	  of	  other	  groups?	  
	  













☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 	  Question	  3:	  For	  the	  following	  question,	  we	  will	  compare	  your	  response	  to	  the	  response	  of	  one	  randomly	  selected	  other	  person	  in	  your	  group.	  That	   is,	  you	  will	  receive	  the	  additional	  payment	  if	  your	  response	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  one	  randomly	  selected	  other	  member	  of	  your	  group.	  	  
Suppose	  that,	  in	  Stage	  2,	  a	  Worker	  rolled	  a	  1	  on	  his	  or	  her	  die.	  How	  appropriate	  would	  it	  
have	  been	  for	  that	  Worker	  to	  report	  a	  higher	  number	  than	  1	  in	  Stage	  2	  of	  the	  experiment,	  
when	  earnings	  were	  based	  on	  the	  group	  performance	  level	  of	  the	  Worker’s	  group	  and	  on	  













☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 	  {WORKERS:	  Question	  4:	  For	  the	  following	  question,	  we	  will	  compare	  your	  response	  to	  the	  response	  provided	   in	  Question	  3	  by	  the	  Supervisor	   in	  your	  group.	  That	   is,	  you	  will	  receive	  the	  additional	  payment	  if	  your	  response	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  the	  Supervisor	  in	  your	  group	  when	  answering	  Question	  3.	  For	  your	  information,	  we	  present	  Question	  3	  again,	  below.}	  {SUPERVISORS:	  Question	  4:	  For	  the	  following	  question,	  we	  will	  compare	  your	  response	  to	  the	  response	  provided	  in	  Question	  3	  by	  one	  randomly	  selected	  other	  Supervisor	  in	  today’s	  session.	  That	  is,	  you	  will	  receive	  the	  additional	  payment	  if	  your	  response	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  one	  randomly	  selected	  other	  Supervisor	  when	  answering	  Question	  3.	  For	  your	  information,	  we	  present	  Question	  3	  again,	  below.	  }	  
Suppose	  that,	  in	  Stage	  2,	  a	  Worker	  rolled	  a	  1	  on	  his	  or	  her	  die.	  How	  appropriate	  would	  it	  
have	  been	  for	  that	  Worker	  to	  report	  a	  higher	  number	  than	  1	  in	  Stage	  2	  of	  the	  experiment,	  
when	  earnings	  were	  based	  on	  the	  group	  performance	  level	  of	  the	  Worker’s	  group	  and	  on	  
the	  performance	  level	  of	  other	  groups?	  













☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 	  	  
Elicitation	  of	  Protected	  Values	  (on	  computer	  screen)	  1)	  People	  inside	  a	  firm	  can	  sometimes	  make	  more	  money	  for	  themselves	  and	  for	  their	  co-­‐workers	  by	  misreporting	  information	  to	  people	  outside	  the	  firm.	  That	  is,	  to	  benefit	  their	  firm,	  people	  may	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  report	  having	  done	  better	  at	  their	  job	  (more	  sales,	  higher	  profits)	  than	  is	  actually	  true.	  	  What	  is	  your	  opinion	  on	  people	  engaging	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  misreporting?	  Please	  choose	  the	  appropriate	  category.	  That	  is:	  very	  immoral	  	    	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  moral	  not	  at	  all	  praiseworthy	  	    	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  praiseworthy	  not	  at	  all	  blameworthy	  	    	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  blameworthy	  not	  at	  all	  outrageous	  	    	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  outrageous	  not	  at	  all	  acceptable	  	    	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  acceptable	  	  2)	  People	  often	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  inflate	  how	  well	  they	  appear	  to	  have	  performed	  at	  their	  job.	  Some	  view	  such	  modification	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  truthfulness,	  others	  regard	  it	  as	  acceptable	  protection	  of	  personal	  interests.	  What	  do	  you	  think	  about	  the	  value	  of	  truthfulness	  in	  such	  a	  situation?	  	  Truthfulness	  is	  something...	  ...	  that	  one	  should	  not	  sacrifice,	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  (material	  or	  other)	  benefits.	  very	  strongly	  disagree   	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  strongly	  agree	  ...	  for	  which	  I	  think	  it	  is	  right	  to	  make	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  very	  strongly	  disagree   	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  strongly	  agree	  ...	  that	  cannot	  be	  measured	  in	  monetary	  terms.	  very	  strongly	  disagree   	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  strongly	  agree	  ...	  about	  which	  I	  can	  be	  flexible	  if	  the	  situation	  demands	  it.	  very	  strongly	  disagree   	     	     	     	     	     	      very	  strongly	  agree	  	  
